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The division of public contracts into lots under EU Directive 2014/24/EU: 
minimum harmonisation and impact on SMEs in public procurement? 
 
Martin Trybus* 
 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME) are at the heart of the economies of all 
Member States. However, many deem their share of public contracts insufficient. This 
article provides a detailed discussion of the most important ‘innovation’ of the EU 
Public Sector Directive 2014/24/EU directed at increasing the participation of SMEs 
in public procurement: the regime on the division of larger contracts into smaller lots. 
The analysis considers economic theory and a selection of national laws transposing 
the Directive. It is argued that, due to a low level of harmonisation, no substantial 
change occurred compared to the previous Directive. It is thus unlikely that SME 
participation in public procurement will increase in many Member States through this 
regime on the division into lots.         
 
1. Introduction 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME)1 are at the heart of the economies of all 
EU Member States. In 2011 over 20 million SMEs were active in the EU, which 
equalled 99.8% of all enterprises, contributed more than half to the Union’s GDP,2 
and created considerably more employment than larger companies do. However, 
many consider their share of the public procurement market too small. Not least the 
consultation conducted before the 2011 Draft Proposal which led to Public Sector 
Directive 2014/24/EU3 had identified that, according to many stakeholders, better 
*University of Birmingham. Thanks to Luke Butler, Maria Anna Corvaglia, and Rilka Dragneva 
(Birmingham), Albert Sánchez Graells (Bristol), François Lichère (Aix-en-Provence), Martin Burgi 
(Munich), Susie Smith (Bristol), and Małgorzata Stachowiak (Warsaw) for comments on earlier drafts, 
and to the participants of the 5th European Public Procurement Law meeting in Aix-en-Provence in July 
2013, the 10th Ebiz Conference in Ostrava in November 2015, the 2nd Public Procurement Reform 
Conference in Łodz in October 2015, a seminar organised by Pinsent Masons LLP in Birmingham in 
April 2015, the Public Procurement: Global Revolution VIII conference in Nottingham in June 2017, 
the UNCITRAL 50th Anniversary Congress in Vienna in July 2017, and the Nordic Procurement Forum 
in Copenhagen in November 2017 for their feedback. All mistakes, however, are my own. 
1 There is no universally accepted definition of an SME in the EU. Therefore, the precise understanding 
of the concept varies in the Member States. However, for its purposes Article 83(3) Public Sector 
Directive 2014/24/EU adopted Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, which defines SMEs as 
enterprises with up to 250 employees and an annual turnover of up to €50 million and/or an annual 
balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million (Article 2(1) of Title I of the Annex to Commission 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises [2003] OJ L124/36). A further differentiation is provided with definitions of micro- 
(Ibid., Article 2(3): “[…] an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons and whose annual 
turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 2 million.”, small, (Article 2(2) 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC: “[…] an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and whose 
annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 10 million.”, and medium sized 
enterprises (the limit of Article 2(1) Recommendation 2003/361/EC). These definitions are also used in 
the UK, see the Lord Young report of May 2012: Make Business Your Business: Supporting the Start-
up and Development of Small Business (First Part of the Report on Small Firms, at 2.).   
2 G. Wessel Thomassen et altera, SME’s access to public procurement markets and aggregation of 
demand in the EU, PwC, ICF-GHK and ECORYS, Study commissioned by the European Commission, 
Directorate General for Internal Market and Services, Brussels, February 2014, at 5. 
3 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L94/65. For overviews of this Directive 
see: F. Lichère, R. Caranta and S. Treumer, Modernising Public Procurement: The New Directive 
(Djøf: Copenhagen, 2014). Directive 2014/24/EU is part of the 2014 procurement reform package 
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access of SMEs to public contracts was one of the issues of concern.4 This should not 
only be achieved through the targeting of administrative burdens and costs of 
participation but also through changes to the EU legislative framework, an opinion 
supported by most stakeholders. The promotion of SMEs was then highlighted as one 
of the five main points of the 2014 reform of the EU procurement Directives.5 Recital 
124 of the final Directive 2014/24/EU emphasises the importance of SMEs for the 
Internal Market and the necessity to address this in the instrument.6 More specifically, 
the Directive purportedly contains four main ‘innovations’ directed at increasing their 
participation in public procurement: the division of contracts into lots, the European 
Single Procurement Document, the limitation of requirements for participation, and 
direct payments to subcontractors.7  
which also includes two further Directives: Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport 
and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC [2014] OJ L94/243 and Directive 
2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of 
concession contracts [2014] OJ L94/1. For an overview of the reform: R. Caranta, “The changes to the 
public contract directives and the story they tell about how EU law works” (2015) 52 CML Rev. 391–
459; Issues 3 and 4 of the (2014) 23 PPL Rev.; and G. Skovgaard Ølykke and A. Sánchez Graells 
(eds.), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules in 2014 (Edward Elgar: 
Cheltenham, 2017).  
4 European Commission “Working Paper, Green Paper on the Modernisation of EU Public 
Procurement Policy: Towards a More Efficient European Procurement Market, Synthesis of Replies 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2011/public_procurement/synthesis_document_
en.pdf [accessed 9 February 2018], at 14. The division of contracts into lots and caps on turnover was 
more controversial. Public authorities were generally sceptical whereas the private sector was divided 
over these issues. 
5 See the 11 February 2014 Council Press Release and European Parliament Press Release.  
6 See also Recital 87 Utilities Directive 2014/25/EU. 
7 Marta Andrecka and the author recently discussed these four regimes in “Favouring Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises with Directive 2014/24/EU?” in (2017) 12 EPPPL 217-232 
https://epppl.lexxion.eu/article/EPPPL/2017/3/6 [accessed 9 February 2018]. The new Directive 
2014/24/EU also introduced additional measures for SMEs in less obvious places. These refer to large 
scale dynamic purchasing systems (Recital 66), time limits (Recital 80), design contests (Recital 120) 
and thresholds (Recital 134). Moreover, SME are mentioned for example in Recital 59 where the 
Commission calls for the monitoring of the aggregation of demand as a practice that has the potential to 
disadvantage SMEs. Finally, Saussier has argued that the new Directive moving away from price as an 
award criterion in favour of “the most economically advantageous tender” will have a positive effect on 
SME participation. See: S. Saussier, “L’accès PME aux marches publics: une analyse économique” 
(2009) http://www.webssa.net/files/MARCHEPUB-VFINALE.pdf [accessed 9 February 2018], at 7. 
According to Susie Smith, who discussed this matter with the author in late September 2016, the new 
rules on large scale dynamic purchasing systems appear to prove a particularly effective regime to 
increase SME participation in the UK. Promoting SMEs through public procurement is a long-standing 
policy of the EU, see inter alia: SMEs Participation in Public Procurement in the European 
Community SEC(1992) 722; European Commission Action Programme for SMEs COM(1986) 445 
final; Public Procurement: Regional and Social Aspects COM(1989) 400 final; Promoting SME 
Participation in the Community COM(1990) 166 final. The promotion of SMEs has also been high on 
the agenda in the UK where, more than a year before the April 2016 deadline, the UK Public Contracts 
Regulations 2015 transposed most of the EU measures, and, following the proposals of Lord Young, 
Growing Your Business: A Report on Growing Micro Businesses, The Second Part of the Report on 
Small Firms May 2013, at 19-23, additionally abolished Pre-Qualification Questionnaires for contracts 
below the thresholds, and established the single contract portal ‘contracts-finder’ 
https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder [accessed 9 February 2018] to promote SME participation and 
success in public procurement.  
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To contribute to the discussion on the significance of the 2014 reform towards 
increasing the participation of SMEs in public procurement across the EU,8 this 
article provides a legal analysis of the regime on the division of larger public contracts 
into smaller lots. Public contracts can be very complex and of substantial size and 
value, requiring considerable financial and staff resources and technical expertise. 
Thus, SMEs will often be excluded from public contracts simply because they lack 
the capacity to manage such a large contract in its entirety.9 Moreover, other problems 
SMEs are facing in public procurement, such as the complexity of rules, difficulties of 
access to information, or award criteria are also to a large extent connected to the size 
of the contracts.10 Therefore, there is some indication that a division of large public 
contracts into smaller lots11 would extend the supplier and provider base beyond large 
8 The literature containing this discussion comprises inter alia of: A. Semple, A Practical Guide to 
Public Procurement (OUP, 2015), chapter 7 and see also her blog at 
http://www.procurementanalysis.eu/ [accessed 14 July 2017] entries of 20 January 2014: “Five myths 
of the new procurement directives”, 6 March 2014: “New procurement directives: comparing the final 
text to earlier versions”, 30 March 2015: “Can we have an evidence based procurement policy?”, and 
26 January 2016: “Of tick boxes and time bombs”; P. Telles and  A. Sánchez Graells, Public Contracts 
Regulations Commentary, http://pcr2015.uk/regulations/regulation-46-division-of-contracts-intolots/, 
http://pcr2015.uk/regulations/regulation-59-european-single-procurement-document/; I. Herrera 
Anchustegui, “Division into Lots and Demand Aggregation – Extremes Looking for the Correct 
Balance?” in Skovgaard Ølykke & Sánchez Graells, supra note 3, 125-145; F. Lichère, “L’accès PME 
dans la Directive 2014/24” in Y. Marique and K. Wauters (eds.), EU Directive 2014/24 on Public 
Procurement: A New Turn for Competition in Public Markets? (Larcier: Brussels, 2016) 109-120; P. 
Telles, “The European Single Procurement Document” (2017) 4 Upphandlingsrättslig Tidskrift 1; M. 
Trybus, “The Promotion of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in Public Procurement: A Strategic 
Objective of the New Public Sector Directive?” in Lichère, Caranta and Treumer, supra note 3, 255-
280; Trybus & Andrecka, ibid.   
9 While there is no comprehensively convincing empirical evidence, this is common ground for the 
relevant academic disciplines: for law see: C. Bovis, “The Regulation of Public Procurement as a Key 
Element of European Economic Law” (1998) 4 ELJ 220-242, at 223-224; for economics see: V. 
Grimm, R. Pacini, G. Spagnolo, and M. Zanza, “Division into lots and competition in procurement”, 
chapter 7 in N. Dimitri, G. Piga and G. Spagnolo (eds.), Handbook of Procurement (CUP, 2006), at 
179-180; Saussier, supra note 8, at 6, 8, 9 and 10; P.-H. Morand, “SMEs and public procurement 
policy” (2003) 8 Review of Economic Design 301-318, at 303; for business studies see: R. Fee, A. 
Erridge and S. Hennigan, “SMEs and government purchasing in Northern Ireland” (2002) 14 European 
Business Review 326-334, at 329; K. Loader, “Supporting SMEs through government purchasing 
activity” (2005) 31 Public Money and Management 287-294 and C. Bovis, Public Procurement and 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland (Certified 
Accountants Educational Trust: London, 1996); and for political science see: E. K. Sarter, S. Fuchs and 
D. Sack, SME-friendly public procurement in Germany? Legal challenges and political strategies 
(University of Bielefeld supported by the Hans Böckler Stiftung, Working Paper Series ‘Comparative 
Governance’, Working Paper 2, September 2014); see also the European Commission’s 2008 
European Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts 
SEC(2008) 2191, at 5.  
10 Saussier, supra note 7, at 9. 
11 The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) does not 
provide rules on the division into lots. Neither does the 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement 
does not contain rules on the division into lots. The techniques to favour SMEs discussed in the Guide 
to Enactment, at 5-6 do not include the division into lots either. The author proposed the inclusion of a 
division into lots regime for the UNCITRAL Model Law on procurement in a paper delivered to the 
UNCITRAL 50th Anniversary Congress in Vienna in July 2017, see: M. Trybus, “Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises and public procurement regulation: the division of public contracts into lots” in 
Modernising International Trade Law to Support Innovation and Sustainable Development: 
Proceedings of the Congress of the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law, Volume 
4: Papers presented at the congress (United Nations: Vienna, 2017), 371.    
3 
 
                                                 
companies to SMEs12 and thus at the same time increase competition,13 provided, as 
will be discussed below, the division has no parallel negative effects on competition, 
especially due to collusion.   
 
2. Research question and methodology 
The research question discussed in this article is whether the regime on the division 
into lots in Directive 2014/24/EU is likely to achieve its objective of increasing the 
participation of SMEs in competitive procurement procedures. Due to the relative 
novelty of the 2014 Directive and its mostly 2016 but often later transposition, there is 
no sufficient empirical data on its use in practice to conclusively assess whether the 
division into lots regime meets this objective. Therefore, a comparative methodology 
is used to assess the likely impact. This involves most importantly a critical 
comparison with the situation under the old Public Sector Directive 2004/18/EC.14 
The assumption is that if the new regime does not differ substantially from what was 
available under the 2004 EU Directive, little impact towards increasing SME 
participation can be expected from Directive 2014/24/EU. Moreover, economic 
theory, some statistics, and the opinions of stakeholders are used in the analysis.  
As part of the discussion on the likely impact outlined above, the article 
examines the regime on the division into lots as an example of minimum 
harmonisation.15 Minimum harmonisation Directives typically establish a firm floor 
upon which Member States may build stricter standards. Under this approach, 
Member States continue to exercise considerable discretion which could lead to 
national legislative diversity undermining the establishment of a level playing field 
across the EU. SME participation might be increased in some jurisdictions but not in 
others. To determine whether the Directive led to such legislative diversity, a 
selection of national laws transposing the Directive will be discussed, namely those of 
France,16 Germany17 the United Kingdom,18 the Republic of Ireland,19 and Austria.20 
12 L. Carpineti, G. Piga, and M. Zanza, “The Variety of Procurement Practice: Evidence from Public 
Procurement” in Dimitri, Piga, and Spagnolo, supra note 9, 14, at 23-24; C. Bovis, EC Public 
Procurement Law (Longman: London, 1997), at 117; M. Burgi, “Small and medium-sized enterprises 
and procurement law- European legal framework and German experiences” (2007) 15 PPL Rev. 284, at 
293-294.  
13 Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo, and Zanza, supra note 9, at 179; R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan, 
Incentives in Government Contracting (Toronto University Press, 1987), at 57-60; A. Sánchez Graells, 
Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Hart: Oxford, 2nd ed. 2015), at 348-349 citing 
recent empirical support for this effect: M. Amaral, S. Saussier, and A. Yvrande-Billon, “Expected 
Number of Bidders and Winning Bids: Evidence form the London Bus Tendering Model” (2013) 47 
Journal of Transport and Economic Policy 17-34  and also citing J. de Brux and C. Desireux, “To allot 
or not to Allot Public Services? An Incomplete Contract Approach” (2014) 37 European Journal of 
Law and Economics 455-476 emphasising the positive effects of competition for contracting 
authorities. Saussier, supra note 7, at 12, points out that in many sectors the response rate is so low and 
as a consequence competition so limited that an increase in SME participation can be expected to have 
tangible effects on competition and thus drive prices down.  
14 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public 
service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114. 
15 On minimum harmonization under EU law generally, see S. Weatherill, “Beyond preemption? 
Shared competence and constitutional change in the European Community” in D. O’Keefe and P. 
Twomey (eds) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing: London, 1994) and 
M. Dougan, ‘Minimum Harmonization and the Internal Market’ (2000) 37 CML Rev. 853, 854-856.  
16 In France Directive 2014/24/EU was transposed by the Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015 
consolidée par le décret n°2016-360 du 25 mars 2016 (Journal officiel du 27 mars 2016). However, at 
time of writing a larger procurement law reform towards a new Code de la commande publique is still 
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This selection aims to cover the largest jurisdictions of the EU and some smaller 
Member States which use the languages the author is most familiar with. Moreover, 
France and Germany are essential references as they already provided for the 
(compulsory) division into lots before the 2014 reform.21 The article thus also adds to 
literature by providing the contextual and cross-disciplinary analysis of the division 
into lots regime of Directive 2014/24/EU in view of its likely impact and by extending 
the analysis to its national transposition level. It will be argued that, due to a low level 
of harmonisation, no substantial change occurred compared to the previous Directive. 
It is thus unlikely that SME participation in public procurement will increase in many 
Member States through this regime on the division into lots.  
Before discussing the division into lots regime in Directive 2014/24/EU in 
sections 4 to 7, section 3 on the relevance of SMEs in the Internal Market, their share 
of the public contract market, how their promotion interacts with other objectives of 
public procurement regulation, and how the division into lots was addressed in the old 
Directives will facilitate the understanding of the change introduced in 2014.   
 
3. Context: SMEs in the Internal Market and under the old Directives 
Neither the European Commission22 nor Member State governments23 are satisfied 
with the share of SMEs in public contracts. The Commission found in 2008 that for 
contracts above the thresholds of the procurement Directives, the average share of 
ongoing: https://commande-publique.info/2017/03/17/un-code-de-la-commande-publique-en-2018/ 
[accessed 9 February 2018].  
17 In Germany Directive 2014/24/EU was transposed in  §§[sections]97–184 Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) [English: Act against Restrictions of Competition] BGBl. Teil I 
Nr. 8 vom 23.02.2016, S. 203 bis 232 (hereinafter GWB 2016), the Vergabeverordnung (VgV) 
[English: Public Tender Regulation], see Verordnung zur Modernisierung des Vergaberechts 
(VergRModVO) vom 12.04.2016 BGBl. Teil I Nr. 16 S. 624 ff. (hereinafter VgV 2016), and the 
Verdingungsordung für Bauleistungen-EU (VOB/A-EU) [English: Contracting Rules for the Award of 
Public Works] BAnz AT 01.07.2016 B4 and BAnz AT 19.01.2016 B3. 
18 In the United Kingdom Directive 2014/24/EU was transposed with the UK Public Contracts 
Regulations 2015 S.I. 2015 No. 102 which entered in force on 26 February 2015. The United Kingdom 
transposed early because her “Crown Commercial Service team (formerly Cabinet Office) has 
delivered an excellent negotiating outcome for the UK Authorities and business will have earlier access 
to simpler and more flexible rules, freeing up markets and facilitating growth, in particular allowing 
[inter alia] better access to public procurement for SMEs, consistent with non-discrimination and a 
value for money approach [sic].” This statement from a slide show published at 
https://www.gov.uk/transposing-eu-procurement-directives [accessed 9 February 2018], slide 9, was 
confirmed by the presentation of the Crown Commercial Service’s Sally Collier at the Public 
Procurement Week in Cardiff in March 2015 and Peter Bennett at the conference Public Procurement: 
Global Revolution VII in Nottingham in June 2015.    
19 In the Republic of Ireland Directive 2014/24/EU was transposed with the European Union (Award of 
Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 2016, S.I. No. 284/2016 which entered into force on 5 May 
2016. 
20 In Austria Directive 2014/24/EU was partly transposed with the amendment of the 
Bundesvergabegesetz (English: “Federal Procurement Law”] 2006 (BVergG 2006) BGBl. I Nr. 7/2016 
which entered into force on 1 March 2016 (hereinafter BVergG 2016). However, transposition is not 
complete although parts of the SME provisions were transposed with the 2016 amendment.  
21 Lichère, “L’accès PME dans la Directive 2014/24”, supra note 8, at 110. 
22 This is already clear from the first mentioning of SMEs already in Recital 2 of Directive 2014/24/EC 
containing the main objectives of the reformed Directive: “facilitating in particular the participation of 
[SMEs] in public procurement.”  
23 For the UK: H.M. Government Consultation Document: Making public sector procurement more 
accessible to SMEs (2013). According to H.M. Government, in the UK, in 2010 only 6.5% of the 
central government procurement budget went to SME, see: Cabinet Office, Making Government 
business more accessible to SMEs (July 2011), at 7. 
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SMEs in the then EU25 was 64% by number and 42% by value, and as low as 31% in 
the UK.24 However, the 2014 Study SME’s access to public procurement markets and 
aggregation of demand in the EU25 reveals a more differentiated picture. This is based 
on (1) the market share of micro-, small-, and medium-sized businesses,26 (2) 
contracts below or above the thresholds of the Directives,27 (3) the number of 
contracts or their aggregate value, (4) the type of contract: supply, service, or works, 
and (5) the type of contracting entity: central government, regional government, 
utility or other.28 These 2009-11 figures suggest a 56% share of the number of 
contracts above the thresholds awarded to SMEs in the then EU27. By aggregate 
value of these contracts this would be a figure of 29% for contracts above the 
thresholds of the EU procurement Directives and 58-59% for contracts below these 
thresholds. These are the figures for SMEs winning contracts on their own or as the 
lead of a grouping of companies. If SMEs participate in joint bidding arrangements 
with larger companies or as their subcontractors, their share of contracts based on 
aggregate contracts value rises from 29% to 45%. This is still less than their 58% 
share in the economy but not dramatically less.29 Overall, it can be said that SMEs 
already had a considerable share of the procurement markets of the then EU27, with 
variations depending on their size, the size of the contract, the type of the contract, the 
type of the contracting entity and the specific market in question. Moreover, there has 
never been proof of systematic discrimination against them in public procurement. 
The evidence for a discrepancy between their importance for the economy and their 
share of public contracts is “largely anecdotal”, and any figure suggesting such a gap, 
such as the 6.5% figure of the UK Cabinet Office,30 do normally not take account of 
the sectors in which SMEs operate.31 This raises the question whether any legislative 
measures to further promote their participation are warranted. Moreover, this puts the 
research question of this article on the impact of the 2014 division into lots regime 
into perspective, as the participation of SMEs cannot be increased significantly if it is 
already relatively high. There can be only limited impact if there is only limited room 
for improvement.    
 
3.1 Obstacles for SMEs in public procurement 
24 2008 European Code of Best Practices, supra note 9, at 4. 
25 Wessel Thomassen et al., supra note 2, at 24-42. 
26 See supra note 2 for these types of enterprises. 
27 The EU procurement Directives only apply above certain thresholds: see Article 4 Directive 
2014/24/EU: €5,186,000 for works contracts, €134,000 or €207,000 for supply and service contracts 
and €750,000 for particular service contracts (for example for social services). These thresholds are 
updated by the Commission every other year. Thus, currently the thresholds are at €5,548,000 for 
works contracts, €144,000 or €221,000 for supply and service contracts and €750,000 for particular 
service contracts (for example for social services). See: Commission Delegated Regulation 
2017/2365/EU of 18 December 2017 amending Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council in respect of the application thresholds for the procedures for the award of contracts 
[2017] OJ L337/19. More on these thresholds in section 3 below. 
28 Wessel Thomassen et altera, supra note 2, at 24-42. 
29 Similarly, the figures for the UK (Wessel, Thomassen et altera, ibid., at 34-35) suggest an SME share 
of 55% of the number of contracts and 26% of their aggregate value for contracts above the thresholds. 
This means that H.M. Government might not be and has never been that far away from its 25% by 
value target of central government spend for SMEs (directly and through the supply chain), see: H.M. 
Government Consultation Document, supra note 23, at 8. 
30 H.M. Government Consultation Document, ibid. 
31 Semple, “Can we have evidence-based procurement policy?” Public Procurement Analysis, blog 30 
March 2015, http://www.procurementanalysis.eu/ [accessed 14 July 2017]. See also her book A 
Practical Guide to Public Procurement, supra note 8, chapter 7. 
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A 2013 UK Federation of Small Business survey found varied reasons for their 
members not participating in public procurement procedures. 44% perceived public 
contracts as not being relevant to their business, 31% were not aware of suitable 
opportunities, 20% found the process too time consuming or costly and 13% thought 
that they could not compete with other suppliers or had little chance of winning.32 
These finding are comparable to those of a 2005 Study on the basis of questionnaires 
sent to 800 SMEs in the Rhine/Main Region of Germany,33 a Study into the works 
contracts awarded by a selection of German local authorities of the same year,34 and a 
2004 online survey of the Court Registrar of the Commercial Court of Paris.35 The 
size of contracts is not directly listed as one of the main problems in these surveys and 
in the 2010 Evaluation of SME Access to Public Procurement Markets in the EU36 
only a relatively small number of SMEs saw the large contract size as a main 
problem. However, Saussier argues that this can be explained with an ‘auto-selection 
effect’ of SMEs responding to surveys.37 SMEs do not name the size of the contract 
as an important problem because they do not intend to bid for large contracts anyway 
due to their limited capacity and concern to become over-dependent on one single 
contract.38 The European Code of Best Practices and economic theory consider that 
one of the main problems SMEs are facing most frequently in public and utilities 
procurement are the high financial and staff costs for participating in large contracts 
and connected to this challenge the administrative burden involved in producing the 
required documentation to prove financial and technical capability, demanding 
participation requirements for public contracts such as minimum turnovers, and the 
late payment of bills.39 Thus, most problems SMEs are facing in public procurement 
are to a large extent connected to contract size.40 These conditions also affect large 
companies. However, large companies have more staff to deal with the administrative 
burden of public procurement, can more easily meet financial participation conditions 
such as a minimum turnover requirement due to their size, and can wait longer for 
payments due to their larger resources and better access to private finance.  
Moreover, there is some evidence that SMEs are less successful in being 
awarded larger contracts. The 2014 SME’s access to public procurement markets and 
aggregation of demand in the EU Study revealed a general rule that the larger a 
contract or lot, the less likely it will be awarded to an SME, from a contract or lot 
value of about €60,000.00 (£59,000.00).41 
 
32 Federation of Small Businesses, Local Procurement: making the most of small business, one year on 
(June 2013), http://www.fsb.org.uk/docs/default-source/fsb-org-uk/policy/assets/local-procurement-
2013.pdf [accessed 11 September 2017]. 
33 E. Ruh, “Mittelstandsbeteiligung an öffentlichen Aufträgen“ (2005) 5 Vergaberecht 718 et seq. 
34 W. Golembiewske and F. Migalk, Praxis der Vergabe öffentlicher Bauaufträge unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung staatspolitischer Zielsetzungen (Institute of SME Studies of the University of 
Mannheim, 2005).   
35 www.greffe-tc-paris.fr/communication/marches_publics.htm [accessed 9 February 2018]. 
36 7% of companies raised contract size: GHK and Technopolis for the European Commission (2010), 
https://www.uzp.gov.pl/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/28054/8.Raport_dostc499p20do20rynku.pdf 
[accessed 11 September 2017], at 49. 
37 Saussier, supra note 7, at 6. 
38 Ibid. 
39 European Code of Best Practices, supra note 9, at 2-3. Saussier, supra note 7, at 8; L. Rapp, « 7 
solutions pour améliorer l’accès des PME aux contrats de la commande publique », CP-ACCP, Nov. 
2014, at 55. 
40 Saussier, ibid., at 9. 
41 Thomassen et altera, supra note 2, at 5. 
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3.2 Problems with and benefits of the promotion of SMEs in public procurement 
A problem caused by any measure promoting SME participation is that this can make 
the applicable procurement law more complicated and therefore less user-friendly and 
prone to violations and litigation. This can be a deterrence for SME participation in 
itself.42 Moreover, these measures can lead to additional costs for both bidders and 
contracting authorities43 and are often intended to promote local economies; smaller 
companies are frequently local companies, and ‘local’ almost inevitably means 
national.44 This implies protectionism which cannot be reconciled with the Internal 
Market,45 which is one reason why, as explained below, the old Public Sector 
Directive 2004/18/EC did not contain many adjustments to promote SMEs46 and the 
Commission initially addressed SMEs with soft law.47 However, the protectionist 
aspect of the objective has to be put into perspective: not all SMEs can be seen as 
only local and therefore national enterprises; some SMEs operate globally.         
More SME participation in public contracts could increase competition 
through a wider and more innovative supplier and provider base and thus have an 
42 Ibid. 
43 This article does not discuss whether the promotion of SMEs can be classified as a ‘secondary’ (term 
used inter alia in by M. Burgi, D. Dragos et altera and G. Racca in their chapters in R. Caranta and M. 
Trybus (eds.), The Law of Green and Social Procurement, Djøf: Copenhagen, 2010),  ‘sustainable’ 
(term used in the chapters of R. Caranta, S. Treumer, L. Vidal, M. Spyra, J. Gonzaléz Garcia and M. 
Trybus in Caranta and Trybus, ibid.), ‘horizontal’ (term coined by S. Arrowsmith and P. Kunzlik in 
“Public procurement and horizontal policies in EC law: general principles” Social and Environmental 
Policies in EC Procurement Law, CUP, 2009), or ‘strategic’ (term used inter alia in W. Kahlenborn et 
altera, Strategic Use of Public Procurement in Europe, Final Report to the European Commission, 
MARKT/2010/02/C 2011) objective, as a ‘community benefit’ (term used in a session of the 2015 
Procurement Week organised by the University of Bangor and the Welsh Government in Cardiff), akin 
to social or environmental (see Caranta and Trybus, ibid.) considerations in public procurement. 
However, this discussion is provided in Trybus and Andrecka, supra note 7. 
44 Ruh, supra note 33, at 735 reports that 80% of the turnover of the SMEs who returned his 
questionnaire is made within 20 km from the seat of the company. Promoting SME thus often means 
promoting domestic SMEs and even SMEs from the same region as the contracting authority. To an 
extent, deeply integrated border regions of two or more Member States, such as the Belgian-Dutch-
German region around Hasselt-Maastricht-Aachen, might be an exception. The danger of SME friendly 
polices to foster an anti-competitive or anti-free movement effect is acknowledged by Lichère, 
“L’accès PME dans la Directive 2014/24”, supra note 8, at 119. 
45 Traditionally the Court of Justice established a rather restrictive approach to the use of public 
procurement to promote secondary objectives. See inter alia: Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland v. 
Helsinki Kaupunki [2002] ECR I-7213; Case C-448/01, EVN Wienstrom AG v. Austria [2003] ECR I-
14521; Case C-31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes v. The Netherlands [1988] ECR 4365; Case C-225/98, 
Commission v. France (Nord Pas de Calais) [2000] ECR I-4475. See also: S. Arrowsmith, The Law of 
Public and Utilities Procurement. Regulation in the EU and the UK, Vol. 1 (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 3rd ed. 2014), at 8 and 1256-93; and P. A. Trepte, Regulating Procurement. Understanding 
the Ends and Means of Public Procurement Regulation (OUP, 2004), at 168-76. However, there is 
some evidence to demonstrate CJEUs shift towards allowance of pursuing broader sustainable 
objectives. See: CJEU’s more recent ruling in Case C-115/14, RegioPost GmbH & Co. KG v Stadt 
Landau in der Pfalz, (RegioPost) EU:C:2015:760, upholding minimum wage clause; and Case C-
368/10, Commission v Netherlands (Dutch Coffee) EU:C:2012:284, allowing to address social 
considerations such as fair trade in award criteria. See Trybus and Andrecka, supra note 7. 
46 Recital 32 Directive 2004/18/EC wants to “encourage the involvement of small and medium-sized 
undertakings in the public contracts procurement market, […]” but to that end only considers that “it is 
advisable to include provisions on subcontracting.” The emphasis on subcontracting is confirmed by 
the provisions on subcontracting in Articles 25 and 60, the remainder of the instrument not containing 
any SME relevant provisions, apart from the aggregation rule in Article discussed below. See: Lichère, 
“L’accès PME dans la Directive 2014/24”, supra note 8, at 110.     
47 European Code of Best Practices, supra note 9. 
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effect on the objective of value for money.48 Economic theory supports this positive 
effect on competition; it also emphasises that specialised SMEs can be more efficient 
on certain contracts or contract parts requiring their specialism; and that their 
participation makes collusion between the big companies more complicated.49 
Moreover, since in contrast to large companies SMEs exist in all and especially also 
the smaller Member States, the participation of these companies has also an Internal 
Market dimension, furthering the free movement of goods and services in all Member 
States. In other words, it promotes a European procurement market not just for big 
business in big Member States. Finally, SMEs create proportionately more 
employment than large companies, train more people, provide economic stability even 
during an economic crisis, and are loyal to the regions in which they are based.50  For 
all these reasons, which as Burgi rightly points out are difficult or impossible to 
quantify,51 SMEs are close to the heart of politicians in all the Member States, as 
shown inter alia by the references to SMEs in Articles 158(2)(b), 173(1) and 179(2) 
TFEU.52  
 
4. The division of larger contracts into lots 
Public contracts can be divided into lots until any resulting lot becomes indivisible.53 
Lots can be homogeneous54 and heterogeneous.55 Regarding the number of lots, there 
is some evidence indicating that a division into many lots (more than 10) considerably 
increases the participation and chances of micro-and small companies of being 
awarded the contract. In contrast, the division into only a few lots (2-4) reduces 
participation from small, medium-sized, and large enterprises and only increases 
participation and chances of micro-companies.56 Additionally, the size of the lots 
determines which companies have sufficient capacity to bid for at least one lot.57 Thus 
the number and size of the lots appears crucial for SME participation and success. The 
European Code of Best Practices had highlighted this quantitative effect of the 
division into lots.58 It also emphasised a qualitative effect whereby “the content of the 
48 M. Burgi, “Mittelstandsfreundliche Vergabe: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen (Teil1)“ (2006) 17 Neue 
Zeitschrift für Bau- und Vergaberecht 606-610, at 607.   
49 See Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo, and Zanza, supra note 9, 168-192; Saussier, supra note 7, at 2. 
50 Burgi, “Small and medium-sized enterprises and procurement law”, supra note 12, at 285. 
51 Burgi, “Mittelstandsfreundliche Vergabe“, supra note 48, at 607, who also cites H. Willems, Die 
Förderung des Mittlestands: Witschafsverfassungsrechtliche Legitimation und Vergaberechtliche 
Realisierung (Carl Heymanns: Cologne, 2003), at 56 for a systematic documentation of the poltical 
motivations for SME promotion in public procurement. 
52 These are Treaty articles which require the unanimous approval of all Member States. 
53 M. M. Linthorst, J. Telgen, and F. Schotanus, “Buying bundles: the effects of bundling attributes on 
the value of bundling”, Proceedings of the 2008 International Procurement Conference in Amsterdam, 
at 4, define the term ‘undividable’ as undividable for buyer’s markets, which they explain by example: 
“Consider buying a bundle of electricity for two office buildings. According to the definition this will 
be a bundle of two products; you can find a supplier willing to deliver electricity for one of your office 
locations. Buying electricity for a part of an office building would be much harder, because no markets 
exist for supplying electricity to parts of office buildings. So the undividable product of the bundle is 
one office building.” 
54 Each lot consists of the same product (for example cars or cleaning services). 
55 Each lot consists of a different product, for example when the contracts for a new airport is divided 
into different lots for the construction of the building, doors, electrical appliances, windows, toilets, etc. 
56 J. Stake, “SME Participation and Success in Public Procurement” (Södertörn University, 2014), at 
23. 
57 See Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo, and Zanza, supra note 9, at 168. 
58 Supra note 9, at 17. 
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lots may correspond more closely to the specialised sector of the SME.59 These two 
effects reappear in the crucial Recital 78 of Directive 2014/24/EU60 discussed below. 
In addition to number, size, and specialism of the lots, their geographical dispersion 
can be of importance, for example by reducing transportation costs for relevant 
contracts.61 Proximity is regularly an advantage for SMEs.62 Lots can even be divided 
according to duration:63 ‘lots as slots’. Overall, to meet its objectives the division into 
lots requires knowledge of and proximity to the market on the side of the contracting 
authorities. 
 
4.1 Problems with and benefits of the division into lots 
The division into lots was already suggested by the European Code of Best Practices 
which, however, warned that this had to be “appropriate and feasible in the light of 
the respective works, supplies and services concerned.”64 This addresses an issue that 
needs to be balanced with the objective of facilitating SME access to procurement 
procedures: the effect of a division into lots on the costs, complexity and management 
of public contracts.65 Awarding a larger contract lowers administrative costs66 and 
increases buying power67 and economies of scale.68 Moreover, division might 
undermine the effectiveness of procurement when it is not technically or 
economically feasible or when the number of size of the lots is not geared towards the 
market in which they are to generate competition. Reasons not to divide into lots 
include that the different components of a contract are highly dependent on each other 
or when there is a need to coordinate them.69  
These potential disadvantages are also reasons why stakeholders were divided 
on the issue of division into lots during the consultation process for the new 
procurement Directives. Public authorities were in general quite sceptical about 
“coercive measures” whereas business' opinions were divided.70 Some legal 
academics emphasise the disadvantages. Telles71 and Sánchez Graells72 argue that the 
division into lots undermined the benefits of aggregation by increasing the 
procurement costs for contracting authorities and even the bidders who are required to 
submit multiple bids. Moreover, some argue that lots facilitated collusion 
59 European Code of Best Practices, ibid. 
60 As pointed out by Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, supra note 
13, at 349. See also Recital 87 Utilities Directive 2014/25/EU.   
61 Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo, and Zanza, supra note 9, at 168. 
62 Saussier, supra note 7, at 2. 
63 Saussier, ibid. points out that long duration has a negative impact on SME participation just as large 
size has.   
64 Supra note 9, at 8. 
65 On the additional costs see: McAfee and McMillan, supra note 13, at 57-60.  
66 A. Loman, F. Ruffini and L. de Boer, “Designing ordering and inventory management 
methodologies for purchased parts” (2002) 38 Journal of Supply Chain Management 22-29. In contrast, 
the division into lots can lead to additional administrative burden: Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 470. 
67 J. Ramsay, “The resource based perspective, rents, and purchasing’s contribution to sustainable 
competitive advantage” (2001) 37 Journal of Supply Chain Management 38-47; V. A. Mabert and T. 
Schönherr, “An online RFQ system: a case study” (2001) 5 Practix 1-6. 
68 L. Birou, S. E. Fawcett, and G. M. Magnan, “Integrating product life cycle and purchasing 
strategies” (1997) 33 Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management 23-31.  
69 Linthorst, Telgen, and Schotanus, supra note 53, at 10. 
70 Green Paper, Synthesis of Replies, supra note 4, at 14. 
71 http://www.telles.eu/blog/2015/4/30/public-contracts-regulations-2105-regulation-46 [accessed 22 
August 2017]. 
72 http://howtocrackanut.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/division-of-contracts-into-lots-under.html [accessed 
30 June 2015]. 
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significantly, especially when the lots are of a similar size and in sectors with limited 
supplier base or where collusion is already prevalent.73 This is also highlighted by 
economists.74 Practitioners are equally sceptical, emphasising the “impracticality and 
headaches associated” with the division into lots.75  
Economic theory, however, also suggests positive effects of the division of 
larger contracts into lots, depending on the type of contracting authority, the type of 
contract, contract size, lot size, lot number, the relevant market, and the effects of 
collusion.76 Most importantly, competition and value for money can be improved 
through increased SME participation.77     
 
4.2 Division onto lots under (the old) Directive 2004/18/EC 
Hidden in the fifth paragraph of a provision on “methods for calculating the estimated 
value of public contracts […]”, art.9(5)(a) Public Sector Directive 2004/18/EC78 and 
before that even art.7(4) Services Directive 93/36/EEC,79 art.5(4) Supplies Directive 
92/50/EEC80 and art.6(3) Works Directive 93/37/EEC81 already allowed the division 
of contracts into lots. These provisions were part of the old aggregation regimes with 
an underlying concern about the division into lots with the intention to artificially 
push the value of the lots below the thresholds to avoid the application of these old 
procurement Directives.82 Nevertheless, as Arrowsmith explains, the third paragraph 
of art.9(5)(a) Directive 2004/18/EC was an exception to the aggregation rules 
ultimately designed to encourage division into lots, as some of the lots below the 
thresholds could even be awarded without following the procedures of the Directive.83 
73 Ibid. 
74 See Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo, and Zanza, supra note 9, at 168-192; M. Fana, and G. Piga, “SMEs 
and public contracts“, in G. Piga and S. Treumer, The Applied Law and Economics of Public 
Procurement (Routledge: Oxford, 2013), at 291. 
75 See Semple, supra note 8. 
76 See Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo, and Zanza, supra note 9, at 171, 172, 184, and 188, citing inter alia P. 
Klemperer, Auctions: Theory and Practice (Princeton University Press, 2004); J. Anton and D. Yao, 
“Split awards, procurement, and innovation” (1989) 20 RAND Journal of Economics 538-52; P. 
Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work (CUP, 2004); M. Armstrong, “Optimal Multi-Object 
Auctions” (2000) 67 Review of Economic Studies 455 – 481. 
77 Saussier, supra note 7, at 2. 
78 Article 9 (5) Directive 2004/18/EU [2004] OJ L134/114 read: “(a) Where a proposed work or 
purchase of services may result in contracts being awarded at the same time in the form of separate 
lots, account shall be taken of the total estimated value of all such lots. 
Where the aggregate value of the lots is equal to or exceeds the threshold laid down in Article 7, this 
Directive shall apply to the awarding of each lot. 
However, the contracting authorities may waive such application in respect of lots the estimated value 
of which net of VAT is less than EUR 80000 for services or EUR 1 million for works, provided that the 
aggregate value of those lots does not exceed 20 % of the aggregate value of the lots as a whole.”  
See also the very similar Article 17(6)(a) Utilities Directive 2004/17/EC [2004] OJ L134/1. 
79 Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public 
supply contracts [1993] OJ L199/1. See also the very similar art.14(1) subparagraph 2 Council 
Directive 93/38/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in 
the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors [1993] OJ L-199/84. 
80 Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the 
award of public service contracts [1992] OJ L209/1. 
81 Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts [1993] OJ L199/54. 
82 Article 9(5)(a) paragraph 2 Directive 2004/18/EC: “Where the aggregate value of the lots is equal to 
or exceeds the threshold laid down in Article 7, this Directive shall apply to the awarding of each lot. 
[emphasis added].” 
83 Arrowsmith, supra note 45, margin number 6-122, at 472. 
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However, this exception was strictly limited84 and no other useful detail on lots was 
provided.85 Herrera argues that lots were thus “indirectly incorporated”86 in the 
Directive 2004/18/EC. The discretion about their use was left to the Member States.87 
It is submitted that the provisions of the old Directives also allowed national laws to 
require the division into lots in addition to just allowing it, an interpretation supported 
by the wording of these provisions which do not rule out such a requirement. 
Moreover, the transposing laws in some Member States, not challenged in this respect 
by the Commission or in the CJEU, confirm this interpretation. For example, the 
division into lots was already mandatory under the pre-2014/2016 French88 and 
German89 laws.  
Based on a study of contract award notices, the 2014 Study SME’s access to 
public procurement markets and aggregation of demand in the EU found that for 
2009-11 in the then EU27 16% of contracts were divided into 2-4 lots, 7% into 5-9, 
3% into 10-19 and 2% even into 20-50 lots. In the UK, where the division into lots 
was not prescribed by law, the figures were close to this average with 15% (2-4), 8% 
(5-9), and 4% (10-19). In France with her since 2006 compulsory division into lots the 
figures were slightly higher with 24% (2-4), 10% (5-9), and 5% (10-19).90 Perhaps 
surprisingly, since covering a period before the transposition of the 2004 Directives, 
the 2007 Study Evaluation of SMEs’ Access to Public Procurement Markets in the EU 
reported that for 2002-2005 across the then EU15 and later EU25 38% of contracting 
authorities divided contracts regularly.91 The crucial feature of this old division into 
lots regime of the EU was that it was rather permissive, allowing national regimes that 
(a) did not allow division, (b) did leave the decision about division to the contracting 
authorities, and (c) required division, with or without exceptions. Moreover, most 
crucially art.9(5) Directive 2004/18/EC appeared to merely tolerate and perhaps 
timidly encourage division into lots, rather than require it. The practice was only 
clearly encouraged in the later 2008 European Code of Best Practices,92 a 
Commission Staff Working Document just about qualifying as soft law. There was no 
‘hard law’ harmonisation beyond allowing division. 
   
5. Divide (or explain) under Directive 2014/24/EU  
In contrast to the situation described under 4 above, art.46(1) Directive 2014/24/EU 
now expressly and specifically provides that contracting authorities may award 
contracts divided into separate lots while they are free to determine the size and 
84 See the value thresholds for the lots and the limitation of the share of the lots in art.9(5)(a) para 3. 
85 Nor in Article 17(6)(a) Utilities Directive 2004/17/EC. Only, equally hidden, Annex VII A Directive 
2004/18/EC provided that contract notices for contracts that are subdivided into lots, must indicate “the 
possibility of tendering for one, for several or all of the lots”.     
86 Herrera Anchustegui, supra note 8, at 127 also citing arts.11, 12, 13 of the 2001 Draft Proposal for 
this Directive.  
87 Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, supra note 13, at 347.   
88 Article 10 Code des Marchés Publics 2006. 
89 Old § 97 III Competition Act (GWB). See Burgi, “Small and medium-sized enterprises and 
procurement law”, supra note 12, at 288-289. 
90 Wessel Thomassen et altera, supra note 2, at 53. 
91 M. Vincze et altera, Evaluation of SMEs’ Access to Public Procurement Markets in the EU, GHK 
and Technopolis for the European Commission DG Enterprise and Industry, Brussels, 2007, Executive 
Summary, at 7.   
92 Supra note 9. 
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subject-matter of such lots.93 This is clearly intended as a technique to promote SME 
participation in public procurement.94 
 
5.1 Scope of the regime 
Article 46 of the final 2014 Directive differs from art.44 of the 2011 Draft Proposal 
which set a threshold of €500,000 for the division into lots.95 By abandoning that 
higher threshold, the final text of art.46 Directive 2014/24/EU extended the regime to 
its entire scope above the general thresholds of €135,000 (central government) or 
€209,000 for supplies and services and €5,225,000 for works.96 This is relevant for 
supplies and services contracts between these thresholds but not for works contracts. 
The 2014 Study SME’s access to public procurement markets and aggregation of 
demand in the EU found that the share of micro businesses bidding for public 
contracts decreased from a contract value of about €100,000.00, of small enterprises 
from about €300,000.00 and of medium-sized companies from about €5 million.97 
The extension of the scope of the division into lots regime in the final text of the 
Directive is therefore particularly relevant for micro-businesses and small businesses 
the participation of which normally decreases from contract values very close to the 
thresholds of the Directive for supplies and services (micro)98 or below the originally 
envisaged threshold of €500,000.00 (small). In Austria,99 France,100 Germany,101 
Ireland,102 and the UK103 the division into lots regime applies to the entire scopes of 
their respective transposing legislation.  
With regards to micro-businesses, the division into lots can even be relevant 
for some contracts below the thresholds of the Directive. However, that would be for 
the national legislators to decide since this would be outside the scope of the 
Directive, although the basic principles of the TFEU would still apply.104 There is no 
93 See also the very similar art.65 Utilities Directive 2014/25/EU. 
94 Recital 78 Directive 2014/24/EC reads: “[…] Such division could be done on a quantitative basis, 
making the size of the individual contracts better correspond to the capacity of SMEs, or on a 
qualitative basis, in accordance with the different trades and specialisations involved, to adapt the 
content of the individual contracts more closely to the specialised sectors of SMEs or in accordance 
with different subsequent project phases […]”. 
95 On that earlier proposal: A. Sánchez Graells, “Are the Procurement Rules a Barrier for Cross-Border 
Trade within the European Market? — A View on Proposals to Lower that Barrier and Spur Growth” 
in C. Tvarnø, G. S. Ølykke & C. Risvig Hansen (eds.), EU Public Procurement: Modernisation, 
Growth and Innovation (Copenhagen: DJØF, 2012), 107-133. 
96 See supra note 27 for the revised 2018-20 thresholds: for supply and service contracts for schedule 
one bodies is€144,000, for the same contracts awarded by other bodies it is €221,000. For light touch 
regime contracts (also known as Annex XIV contracts) the threshold remains at €750,000. The works 
contract threshold is now €5,548,000. 
97 Wessel Thomassen et altera, supra note 2, at 39. The Study also found that the share of medium 
sized enterprises increased from about €1 million to €5 million.   
98 Supra note 96. 
99 §§12-16 and 22 BVergG 2006 as amended. 
100 The Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015 does not contain any thresholds and is therefore at 
least applicable to contracts above the thresholds of Directive 2014/24/EU. 
101 §§106 and 97(4) GWB 2016. 
102 Regulations 5 and 46 [Irish] European Union (Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 
2016. 
103 Regulations 5 and 46 [UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2015. 
104 See: Case C-243/89, Commission v. Denmark (‘Storebaelt’) [1993] ECR I-3353; Case C-359/93, 
Commission v. The Netherlands (‘UNIX’) [1995] ECR I-157; Case C-59/00, Bent Mousten 
Vestergaard v. Spøttrup Boligselskab [2001] ECR I-9505. See also Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 185; 
P. Trepte, Public Procurement in the EU (OUP, 2007), at 8 and M. Trybus, “Public procurement in 
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indication in the relevant case law to imply that the TFEU would suggest the division 
into lots. The thresholds represent an example of minimum harmonisation as they 
represent a floor above which harmonisation occurs. Below the thresholds, Member 
States can go deeper than the minimum floor and introduce legislation, but based on 
the principles of TFEU, not based on a detailed Directive. The question whether 
Member States should introduce the division into lots below the thresholds cannot be 
addressed within the confines of this article. There is nothing in the Directive to 
encourage division below the thresholds and the original higher threshold of 
€500,000.00 suggests that the EU legislator envisaged lots only for larger contracts. 
The transposing laws of Austria, Ireland, and the UK, which allow but do not require 
the division into lots, also allow it below the thresholds. In Austria, a special regime 
for contracts below the thresholds applies when the cumulative value of the lots 
remains under the thresholds and lots of supplies and services contracts below 
€50,000.00 can be awarded without competition.105 In the UK,106 Ireland,107 and 
Austria,108 there are also rules for contract values above €84,000.00 for supplies and 
services and €1 million for works. The transposing law of France does not contain any 
thresholds. The German GWB 2016 applies only above the thresholds.109 The 
thresholds for €80,000.00 for supplies and services and €1 million for works in the 
Austrian, British, and Irish laws reflect the lot-specific aggregation rules in art.5(8) - 
(10) Directive 2015/24/EU, normally requiring application of the Directive and 
transposing national legislation to the award of lots below the thresholds of the 
Directive but only above these lot-specific thresholds.110 Thus the thresholds as 
minimum harmonisation have already led to legislative diversity in the national 
transpositions, also with respect to the division into lots.       
 
5.2 Discretion of the contracting authorities: nature of the lots 
According to art.46(1) Directive 2014/24/EU the size and subject matter of the lots 
are to be determined by the contracting authority. This discretion does not change the 
division into lots regimes in Member States where such rules have been in place 
before the Directive, such as France111 and Germany112 or the old non-regulated 
approach in the UK.  
European Union internal market law”, in R. Nogouellou and U. Stelkens (eds.) Comparative Law on 
Public Contracts Treatise (Bruylant: Brussels, 2010) 81-121. 
105 §15(5) BVergG 2006 as amended (supplies), §16(6) BVergG 2006 as amended (services).  
106 Regulation 5(14) [UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2015. 
107 Regulation 5(13) [Irish] European Union (Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 2016. 
108 §14(3) BVergG 2006 as amended (works), §15(4) BVergG 2006 as amended (supplies), §16(5) 
BVergG 2006 as amended (services).  
109 However, in 2017 new procurement order for contracts below the thresholds was issued, the 
Verfahrensordnung für die Vergabe öffentlicher Liefer-und Dienstleistungsaufträge unterhalb der EU-
Schwellenwerte (Unterschwellenvergabeverordnung – UVgV) BAnz AT 07.02.2017 B1, Berichtigung 
der Bekanntmachung vom 8. Februar 2017 in BAnz AT 08.02.2017 B1, was published, which however 
is not enforceable through the GWB but is linked to §55 BHO (Federal Budget Order). §22 UVgV 
contains the regime on the division into lots.  
110 Thus for lots of services and supplies contracts for contracts from €80,000 to €144,000 or €221,000 
and for lots of works contracts from €1 million to €5,548,000, see the “small lots” thresholds for 2018-
20, supra note 27 or https://www.ojec.com/thresholds.aspx/ [accessed 9 February 2018]. 
111 Article 10 CMP 2006: “A cette fin [passer le marché en lots séparés], il [le pouvoir adjudicateur] 
choisit librement le nombre de lots […]”. Translation of the author: “To the end of dividing the 
contract into lots, the contracting authority is free to choose the number of the lots. “ 
112 The old § 97(3) GWB (Competition Act) did not prescribe the number of size of lots. See also (old) 
Article 2 (2) VOL/A 2009. 
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The number, subject matter, size, and geographical dispersion of the lots affect 
competition in the procurement procedure, the contracting authority’s budget and 
value for money.113 Economic theory supports this discretion to be left to contracting 
authorities.114 Determining the number, size and subject matter of the lots has to take 
account of the frequently evolving market structure, which is determined by the 
number and the behaviour of the potential bidders, otherwise competition and 
ultimately value for money will be compromised.115 Therefore, these characteristics 
can only be determined by the contracting authority, possibly advised by a centralised 
procurement authority or private consultant. In other words, this should not be 
determined in abstract rules by the EU or national legislators. It is therefore submitted 
that the approach in art.46 Directive 2014/24/EU of ‘leaving the details’ to be 
determined by the contracting authorities is appropriate. Nevertheless, the necessity to 
study the relevant market before dividing the contract into lots can stretch the 
capabilities of many contracting authorities and the involvement of private consultants 
and even centralised procurement authorities in this process can be problematic in 
itself, a problem that cannot be discussed further within the confines of this article. 
However, the complexity of the division into lots can also be addressed with training 
and non-binding guidance.   
 
5.3 Compulsory or optional division into lots 
According to art.46(4) Directive 2014/24/EU, Member States may also require rather 
than just allow the division into separate lots in their national laws transposing the 
Directive.116 Thus the French and Germans could continue their already existing 
regimes of compulsory division into lots.117 However, in cases in which this has not 
been made obligatory in the transposing national law, such as in the UK,118 Ireland,119 
and Austria,120 or when not dividing into lots is allowed in certain cases, such as in 
France,121 contracting authorities shall indicate the main reasons for their decision not 
to divide into lots. This means that the division into lots is the default approach 
suggested by the Directive and Member States have the option to make this obligatory 
for all or parts of the contracts subject to the Directive and their transposing national 
laws. However, Directive 2014/24/EU does not require the compulsory division into 
lots,122 although the decision not to divide a contract into lots requires a 
communication of the reasons: the “divide or explain principle”.123  
113 Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo, and Zanza, supra note 9, 168-192; Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement 
and the EU Competition Rules, supra note 13, at 349-350. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo, and Zanza, supra note 9, 168-192; Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement 
and the EU Competition Rules, supra note 13, at 349-350. 
116 Also art.65 (4) Utilities Directive 2014/25/EU.  
117 See: the old art.10 CMP 2006 and old §97(3) GWB, see below, after the transposition of Directive 
2014/24/EU, art.32 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015 and §97(4) GWB 2016 respectively. 
118 Regulation 46 [UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2015. 
119 Regulation 46 [Irish] European Union (Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 2016. 
120 §22 BVergG 2006 as amended in 2016. 
121 Article 32 II. Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015. 
122 See also: Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, supra note 13, at 
348. Contrary, art.46 is interpreted as requiring the compulsory division into lots by M. Assis 
Raimundo (Lisbon Law School), “Aiming at the market you want? A critical analysis of the purpose, 
coherence and judicial review of the duties regarding division into lots under Directive 2014/24/EU”, at 
the Public Procurement Global Revolution VIII conference in Nottingham, 13 June 2017. 
123 S. Smith, “Practical Issues of division into lots (divide and explain principle)”, at the Public 
Procurement: Global Revolution VII conference in Nottingham, 16 June 2015.  
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The interpretation that art.46 does not require Member States to introduce the 
compulsory division into lots is based on the wording of the provision, a contextual 
interpretation, a historical interpretation, and the Directive’s general approach of 
minimum harmonisation. According to the wording of art.46(1) sentence 1 
contracting authorities “may” divide into lots, which clearly expresses an option 
rather than an obligation (wording). In contrast, they “shall” provide reasons when not 
doing so – art.46(1) sentence 2, which clearly expresses an obligation rather than an 
option, an obligation to give reasons not an obligation to divide into lots (context).124 
The wording of Recital 78 Directive 2014/24/EU, which provides that “contracting 
authorities should in particular be encouraged to divide large contracts into lots 
[emphasis added]”, does not suggest a compulsory division into lots either. The third 
paragraph of Recital 78 also contains a list of possible measures to promote SMEs 
that Member States who wish to go further could take in their transposition of the 
Directive. This includes “rendering a division into lots obligatory under certain 
conditions”. As this is only suggested as a possible option to Member States, this 
implies that transposition as a compulsory division into lots is not required from the 
Member States by the Directive (context). Neither the Green Paper,125 nor the 
consultation,126 nor material from the legislative process127 suggest that the final 
art.46 of the Directive intended a compulsory division into lots (historical).128 
Moreover, Member States such as notably the UK, which already transposed the 
Directive in 2015, have not made the division into lots compulsory and in over two 
years have not been challenged regarding this fact by the Commission or the CJEU 
(historical). This suggests that the Member States and the Commission do not 
interpret art.46 as requiring the division into lots. Finally, an interpretation of art.46 as 
requiring the compulsory division into lots in the transposing laws of the Member 
States cannot be reconciled with the division into lots regime as an example of 
124 It is argued that the use of the word “shall” in art.46(1) sentence 2 is not to be interpreted as a 
preference for the division into lots. The express authorisation or permission to divide into lots requires 
an explanation why this choice is not exercised, providing an accountability mechanism and safeguard 
against challenges including through judicial review. Thanks to Luke Butler for discussing this issue 
with me when commenting on an earlier draft of this article.  
125 Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy: Towards a more efficient 
European Procurement Market COM(2011) 15 final. 
126 Green Paper – Synthesis of Replies, supra note 4.  
127 See the European Parliament Press Release: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20140110IPR32386/new-eu-procurement-rules-to-ensure-better-quality-and-value-for-money: 
[accessed 27 September 2017]: New EU-procurement rules to ensure better quality and value for 
money, “The new rules also encourage the division of contracts into lots to make it easier for smaller 
firms to bid [emphasis added].” See the Council debate summary, 2011/0438(COD) -30/05/2012,  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1208755&t=e&l=en [accessed 27 
September 2017]: “[Council members] (ii) fully support the involvement of SMEs in public 
procurement markets, by encouraging contracting authorities to duly consider dividing contracts into 
lots [emphasis added].” Council debate summary, 2011/0438(COD) – 10/12/2012, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1238893&t=e&l=en [accessed 27 
September 2017]: “[…] (iii) an incentive for contracting authorities to consider dividing contracts into 
smaller lots that are more accessible for SMEs [emphasis added]”. 2011/0438(COD) Committee report 
tabled for plenary, first reading/single reading – 11/01/2013, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1242067&t=e&l=en [accessed 27 
September 2017]: “[…] to give consideration to dividing contracts into lots [emphasis added]”. On the 
legislative process see also: Herrera Anchustegui, supra note 8, at 126-132. 
128 See the Commission press release: “New EU public procurement rules: Less bureaucracy, higher 
efficiency”, published on: 20/11/2015, last update: 11/01/2017, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-
databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=8562: [accessed 27 September 2017]: “[…] 
introducing the option of dividing tenders into lots [emphasis added]”. 
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minimum harmonisation proposed below. The compulsory division into lots would go 
beyond the minimum floor of harmonisation and is thus to be decided by the Member 
States. This decision was taken by the French and German legislators but not the 
British and Irish.       
 
5.4 Divide or explain: discretion and review 
It is submitted that a Member State could make the ‘or explain’ in ‘divide or explain’ 
in art.46(1) very easy. This could lead to refraining from a division into lots becoming 
the default approach in practice, unless there is local pressure to divide. Sánchez 
Graells even suggests that ‘divide or explain’ is “conceived as a soft requirement”.129 
Article 46 only requires an explanation, not a justification. Recital 78 suggests a 
justification as an option for Member States who want to go beyond the minimum 
harmonisation requirements of the Directive. This suggests a “soft” nature of the 
explanation requirement in art.46 and could be interpreted as implying that in contrast 
to a justification, the explanation would not have to be subject to judicial review, as 
will be discussed further below. On the other end of the spectrum, as discussed under 
the previous heading above, Member States may also legally require the division into 
lots in their transposing legislation according to art.46(4) Directive 2014/24/EU, 
without the possibility for contracting authorities to refrain from doing so and 
communicate the reasons. In other words, Member States may take the ’or explain’ 
out of ‘divide or explain’ when transposing the new Directive (‘divide only’), as 
Germany appears to have done.130  
For the Member States who, in contrast to Germany, have introduced some 
form of ‘divide or explain’, two important and interrelated questions remain to be 
addressed in their transposing laws: (a) the reasons that can legitimately be an 
explanation to refrain from the division into lots and (b) whether that decision of the 
contracting authority is subject to (judicial) review. There is no harmonisation 
regarding the first question: art.46(1) provides no details on the reasons. However, 
Recital 78 provides some examples:  
 
“[…] the contracting authority finds that such division could risk restricting 
competition, or risk rendering the execution of the contract excessively 
technically difficult or expensive, or that the need to coordinate the different 
contractors for the lots could seriously risk undermining the proper execution 
of the contract.”  
 
Thus, it is submitted that the context of the Directive imposes certain limitations. It 
can safely be assumed that at least (1) technical reasons related to the management of 
the contract can make the division into lots disproportionately difficult or expensive 
and thus would constitute a valid reason not to divide. This case is addressed in 
Recital 78. The Concessions Directive 2014/23/EU, which regulates highly complex 
contracts, does not even include the division into lots, but highly complex contracts 
can also occur within the scope of Directive 2014/24/EU. Moreover, (2) market 
analysis can reveal that the market structure is not susceptible to a division into lots, 
that it would only complicate the procurement without producing the SME bids it is 
designed for – and this would also constitute a valid reason. Finally, it could be 
argued that (3) circumstances such as urgency that allow for the use of less 
129 Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, supra note 13, at 347. 
130 Neither §97(4) GWB 2016 nor §30 VgV contain the “or explain” regime from art.46 Directive 
2014/24/EU. 
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competitive procedures could also justify the decision not to divide into lots. 
However, again, none of these reasons are mentioned in the binding provisions of the 
Directive.       
Recital 78 is very permissive regarding the reasons by highlighting that the 
contracting authority should take the decision “freely” and “autonomously” and “on 
the basis of any reasons it deems relevant”. However, while this suggests a very wide 
and liberal notion of ‘reasons’, again, a contextual interpretation would still impose at 
least some limitations. For example, (1) a categorical policy not to divide into lots or 
an express (2) ‘anti-SME’ approach would compromise the default nature of the 
division into lots in art.46 and the overall SME-friendly approach of the provision and 
the Directive. Moreover, it can be assumed that (3) protectionist motives, for example 
not dividing into lots to favour a large domestic company, would go against the 
Internal Market rationale of the Directive and EU law. Therefore, there are limitations 
and contrary to the wording of Recital 78, what constitutes a “relevant” reason is not 
entirely left to the subjective judgment of the contracting authority but can be 
assessed objectively. English public law, for example, has a doctrine of relevant and 
irrelevant considerations as a ground of judicial review.131  
Germany does not provide for the “or explain element” and consequently the 
German law does not contain any reasons. Neither reg.46 of the (UK) Public 
Contracts Regulations 2015 nor reg.46 of the Irish Regulations 2016 address these 
questions. However, art.32(I) of the 2015 French Ordonnance132 is more specific in 
excluding cases where the subject matter of the contract does not allow the definition 
of distinct lots, when contracting authorities cannot organise, manage, and coordinate 
the divided project by themselves, or when the division into lots could limit 
competition or risks to make the performance of the contract technically more 
difficult or increase costs.133 §22(1) sentence 2 (Austrian) BVergG also provides that 
economic and technical considerations, “for example the necessity of a single 
performance or liability” are reasons for the decision not to divide into lots.134 §22(4) 
containing the “explain” requirement was only introduced in 2016.135 The French and 
Austrian transpositions are compliant with the limitations of the context of the 
Directive and its Recital 78 discussed above. The question is whether the French and 
Austrian laws, in contrast to the British and Irish regulations, require a justification or 
are just more specific on the explanation. None of these national transpositions is 
clear on this issue, although in contrast to an explanation, a justification would have 
required further clarification.   
This leads to the second and related question of whether the decision not to 
divide is subject to judicial review. This is not a matter for Directive 2014/24/EU, but 
ultimately to be determined in the context of the Public Sector Remedies Directive 
131 Thanks to Luke Butler for pointing this out to the author when commenting on a draft of this article. 
132 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015 consolidée par le décret n°2016-360 du 25 mars 2016 
(Journal officiel du 27 mars 2016). 
133 Translation of the author, original: “[…] sauf si leur objet ne permet pas l'identification de 
prestations distinctes […]” and “[…] s'ils ne sont pas en mesure d'assurer par eux-mêmes les missions 
d'organisation, de pilotage et de coordination ou si la dévolution en lots séparés est de nature à 
restreindre la concurrence ou risque de rendre techniquement difficile ou financièrement plus coûteuse 
l'exécution des prestations […]”. 
134 Translation of the author. The German original of [Austrian] §22(1) sentence 2 BVergG 2006 as 
amended reads: “Für die Gesamt- oder getrennte Vergabe von Leistungen sind wirtschaftliche oder 
technische Gesichtspunkte, wie zB die Notwendigkeit einer einheitlichen Ausführung und einer 
eindeutigen Gewährleistung, maßgebend.“  
135 Artikel 1 (5) of the 2016 amendment, supra note 20. 
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665/89/EEC136 and the relevant case law of the CJEU. Neither suggest that the 
decision not to divide into lots would be immune from review. Recital 78 of Directive 
2014/24/EU provides that the decision and the reason(s) for it should be taken 
“autonomously” by the contracting authority “without being the subject to 
administrative or judicial supervision”. However, it is submitted, that despite this 
unfortunate and ill-advised passage of Recital 78, which as part of a mere recital is not 
legally binding anyway, the decision not to divide and the reason(s) for this decision 
are in principle reviewable. First, as Caranta pointed out, the question of review is to 
be assessed on the basis of higher law, namely the principle of effective judicial 
protection enshrined in Articles 47 ECHR and 19(1) TEU, and the case law of the 
CJEU and ECHR,137 as well the rule of law principle of the constitutions of the 
Member States and the review system required in the Public Sector Remedies 
Directive. These sources require the decision not to divide into lots to be reviewable, 
just like any other procurement decision, irrespective of whether that has been 
expressly spelled out in any of the laws transposing Directive 2014/24/EU. Second, 
the administrative judges, or in Germany and the UK also the ordinary judges, put in 
charge of public procurement review have a long experience to review public 
discretion to varying intensity, even when that discretion is very wide. They can leave 
a wide margin of discretion to the contracting authorities and only rule against a 
division in cases of clear violations of legal principles, unreasonableness, or when the 
discretion was not actually exercised at all. There is therefore no strong argument to 
exclude the decision not to divide into lots from judicial review.                  
Member States who introduce the division into lots as the default approach 
may then allow the award as a single contract in exceptional circumstances, require 
the communication of the reasons for doing so and allow challenging the decision not 
to divide into lots in national review bodies.138 In other words, Member States can 
make the ‘or explain’ very difficult by narrowing the situations in which this is 
permissible and make the decision subject to review, as France appears to have 
done.139 However, Directive 2014/24/EU does not harmonise this. Considerable room 
for manoeuvre was therefore left to the national legislators, provided the minimum 
harmonisation standard of ‘divide or explain’ is in place. Directive 2014/24/EU 
allows for both a relatively light touch on the one hand but also rather strict regimes 
on the division into lots on the other hand. This preserved the different national 
regimes on the division into lots140 and is thus likely to preserve the different national 
136 Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public 
supply and public works contracts [1989] OJ L395/33 as amended especially by Directive 2007/66/EC 
[2007] OJ L335/31. 
137 Caranta, supra note 3, at 428. 
138 According to Martin Burgi (Munich) this is the situation in Germany before and after the 
transposition of Directive 2014/24/EU and according to François Lichère (Aix-en-Provence) also in 
France, discussions during the 9th Network Meeting of the European Procurement Law Group in Turin 
on 2 September 2016. Lichère, supra note 8, at 114 highlights the importance of the administrative 
judge (the administrative courts are responsible for public procurement review proceedings in France) 
to police the decision not to divide into lots and points to examples of judgments of the Conseil d’Etat 
in CE 21 mai 2010, Commune d’Ajaccio, req. nº333737 (which allowed the division into only two lots) 
and CE 11 avril 2014, Commune de Montreuil, req. nº 375051 (which imposed a detailed division). 
139 Article 32 I sentence 2 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015. 
140 ‘Divide or explain’ in reg.46 [UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2015; compulsory division into lots 
with ‘explain’ in certain circumstances in French Article 32 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 
2015; compulsory division into lots without ‘explain’ in German §97(4) GWB 2016 and §30 VgV 
2016.  
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levels of SME participation in public procurement.141 The permissiveness of the new 
Directive, arguably a lack of or insufficient harmonisation, did not change the 
procurement laws and practices of the Member States. For example, as mentioned 
above, in France a duty to divide contracts into lots had been introduced in 2006142 
and the French now continue with this rule without any effect of Directive 
2014/24/EU.143 The same can be said about Germany.144 On the other end of the 
spectrum, as explained below, Member States such as the UK, Ireland, or Austria 
have not introduced an obligatory division into lots, thereby also continuing a crucial 
feature of their pre-2014/24/EU practice, which appears to have allowed but not 
encouraged “entering into a number of contracts for a single requirement”.145 
However, as discussed below, the division into lots is now called by its name and 
given a much higher profile in the transposing UK and Irish Regulations and Austrian 
Bundesvergabegesetz. This could be described as an example of minimum 
harmonisation in which the legally prescribed divide or explain principle is the firm 
floor. Following a general approach of only transposing the minimum146 the British, 
but also the Irish and Austrians did not go beyond this firm floor. Making the ‘or 
explain’ option difficult (France) or not transposing it (Germany) are already higher 
standards beyond the firm floor. A crucial question is the precise ‘location’ of the firm 
floor with regards to the modalities of ‘or explain’ – how difficult does art.46(1) 
subparagraph 2 require the ‘or explain’ option in a transposing law to be and what is 
the review mechanism to control the relevant practice in the UK, Ireland, and 
Austria?147   
 
5.5 Article 46 Directive 2014/24/EU: an innovation? 
As this is the first time that a Directive expressly encourages the practice of dividing 
larger contracts into lots, the details of the practice are formally upgraded from soft 
law (European Code of Best Practices) to hard law (art.46) and thus subject to 
harmonisation. However, with regards to substance it is submitted that the only 
innovation introduced by art.46 of Directive 2014/24/EU, in contrast to the old regime 
under art.9(5) Public Sector Directive 2004/18/EC148 and the European Code of Best 
Practice, is the division of larger contracts into lots as the default approach. As 
Lichère rightly points out, expressly addressing the division into lots in art.46 was not 
necessary as it was already permitted before.149 Harmonisation in this respect has no 
141 See the difference in figures in France (higher) and the UK (lower) reported by Wessel Thomassen 
et altera, supra note 2, at 53. 
142 [French] Article 10 CMP 2006. 
143 [French] Article 32 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015. 
144 [German] §97(4) GWB 2016: “The interests of small and medium-sized undertakings shall 
primarily be taken into account in an award procedure. Contracts shall be subdivided into partial lots 
and awarded separately according to the type or area of specialisation (trade-specific lots). Several 
partial or trade-specific lots may be awarded collectively if this is required for economic or technical 
reasons.” This is exactly the same wording as that of the pre-transposition §97(3) GWB.  
145 Regulation 8 (11) [UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2006 S.I. 2006 No.5. See also the prohibition 
in Regulation 8 (15). 
146 Transposition Guidance: How to transpose European Directives effectively (H.M. Government, 
April 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229763/bis-
13-775-transposition-guidance-how-to-implement-european-directives-effectively-revised.pdf 
[accessed 27 September 2017], at 6 (Points 2.2-2.4). 
147 The rules of lot bundling and limitation, discussed under the next heading, are also subject to the 
possibility of higher standards.   
148 And art.17 (6) (a) Utilities Directive 2004/17/EC. 
149 Lichère, “L’accès PME dans la Directive 2014/24”, supra note 8, at 111. 
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effect on France and Germany where this already was the legally prescribed default 
approach,150 or even on the UK where transposition was already allowed before 
2015.151 Sanchéz Graells thus rightly sees the situation as only “slightly altered”.152 
The main aspect of the default nature of the division into lots is introduced by the 
obligation to communicate the reasons for not doing so (“divide or explain”) if it is 
not made compulsory in the transposition. This obligation differs from the other 
Directives of the 2014 reform package, where this is possible but not required153 or 
does not feature at all.154 The formal upgrade to hard law and its default nature give 
the division into lots a “higher profile” in Directive 2014/24/EU.155 As under the old 
Directive 2004/18/EC,156 Member States may legally require the division into lots 
but, as discussed above, Directive 2014/24/EU does not impose this as the only 
approach. 
While, as explained above, the only change introduced by the new Directive is 
the default nature of the division into lots, its higher profile, its upgrade from soft law 
to hard law, it is argued that this is still an innovation. The obligation to provide 
reasons for awarding a single contract forces contracting officers to pause to consider 
the possibility of a division into lots.157 They are obliged to either divide the contract 
into lots or communicate reasons for not doing so. The number of single contract 
awards and the communicated reasons for not dividing them into lots will be in the 
public domain. This will make it possible for the Commission and national legislators 
to review the approach of art.46, to see whether the division into lots is seriously 
considered or whether the use of ‘cut and paste’ standard reasons to explain the award 
of a single large contract suggests that there is an almost automated avoidance of 
division into lots.  
While only the use of the technique in practice will determine whether 
Directive 2014/24/EU did really introduce the division into lots as a default approach, 
certain predictions are already possible now. First, little will change in Member States 
such as France where, as explained above, a mandatory division into lots has been 
operational since 2006 und arguably a maximum of SME participation has been 
achieved.158 The French experience is based on art.10 CMP 2006 which is very 
similar and served as a model for art.46 Directive 2014/24/EU. However, it is 
submitted that the French experience and the very similar German experience, was 
also influenced by very litigious bidder communities with 1,000-2,000 review cases 
150 See [French] art.10 CMP 2006 and old [German] §97(3) GWB and Article 2 (2) VOL/A 2009. 
151 See old Regulation 8(11) [UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2006, S.I. 2006 No. 5 which implies 
that the division into lots is allowed, but does not encourage let alone require it. This is part of the 
provision on thresholds and thus part of the aggregation regime.  
152 Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, supra note 13, at 347. 
153 Article 65(1) Utilities Directive 2014/25/EU provides for the division into lots but does not include 
a “divide or explain” requirement, which is only foreseen as a possibility for Member States to go 
beyond the requirements of the Directive in Recital 87 of Directive 2014/25/EU.          
154 The Concessions Directive 2014/23/EU does not provide for the division into lots. 
155 Smith, “Divide or Explain”, supra note 123. 
156 And the old Public Sector Directive 2004/18/EC. 
157 Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, supra note 13, at 347, 
poignantly put it as follows, art.46 “fundamentally rest[s] on a general expectation that contracting 
authorities will consider the possibility of dividing contracts into lots and where they decide against it, 
provide a justification”.   
158 According to François Lichère the relevant data that does not clearly prove an impact of the 
obligatory division into lots according to art.10 CMP 2006. See also the data in infra note 206. 
According to Wessel Thomassen et al., supra note 2, at 31-40, the share of SME in public contracts is 
not particularly high in France. 
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each year in which the division into lots featured prominently.159 In Germany with its 
compulsory division into lots without discretion of contracting authorities to deviate 
from this obligation, the non-division into lots is fully reviewable.160 This is also the 
case in France where contracting authorities can deviate from the obligation only in 
exceptional circumstances.161 By contrast, in the UK where the Directive was 
transposed a year early, it has been criticised that there are no clear consequences if a 
contracting officer does not comply with the obligation to “explain”.162 He or she only 
has to report “afterwards” and it is not even clear whether this has to be 
communicated in the contract award notice or the reg.84 UK Public Contracts 
Regulations 2015 report.163 Thus this communication ultimately lacks transparency, 
happens too late in the process, and most importantly is not reviewable in practice.164 
In the anyway much less litigious UK, with its handful of procurement judgments per 
year, an increase in SME participation in public procurement appears doubtful.165 
Having said that, this cannot safely be predicted and the numerous but by their nature 
not publicly documented out of court settlements in UK procurement disputes also put 
pressure on contracting authorities to follow the Public Contract Regulations. Thus, 
despite the problems highlighted above,166 “divide or explain” might well increase 
SMEs participation in procurement in the UK.   
 
6. Lot bundling and limitation 
In addition to allowing or requiring the division into lots, procurement laws often 
allow or prohibit that one economic operator bids for more than one of the lots. In an 
ideal market, where there is a multitude of interested bidders, large and small, there 
would be - at the one end of the spectrum - a micro-enterprise bidding for only one of 
the specialised lots and - on the other end - a large company bidding for all lots, with 
many variations in between. Allowing multiple bids for the divided lots might appear 
to contradict the very purpose of the division into lots, which is to increase SME 
159 For example in France: Conseil d’Etat [Supreme Administrative Court], CE 9 juillet 2007, EGF-
BTP, nº 297711 or CE 20 février 2013, Société Biomnis, nº 363656. Examples for Germany: [Federal] 
Vergabekammer Bund, VK 2-105/15 vom 7.12.2015; [State] Vergabekammer Saxony, 1/SVK/O14-16 
vom 26.7.2016; Vergabekammer Bund, VK 2-35/15 vom 17.8.2015; Oberlandesgericht [High Court] 
Munich, Verg 1/15 vom 9.4.2015; Vergabekammer Bund, VK 2-101/14 vom 12.12.2014; [State] 
Vergabekammer Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania, 2 VK 14/14 vom 9.9.2014; Vergabekammer Bund, 
VK 2-115/14 vom 30.1.2015; Vergabekammer Bund, VK 1-114/14 vom 19.1.2015; [State] 
Vergabekammer Brandenburg, VK 11/15 vom 5.8.2015; Kammergericht [High Court] Berlin, Verg 
10/13 vom 20.2.2014.  
160 Burgi, supra note 12, at 293 citing Oberlandesgericht [High Court] Düsseldorf [2005] VergabeR 
109 [responsible for the second instance review of federal contracts] who left it open whether the 
contracting authority has the discretion not to divide into lots. Assuming a discretion not to divide into 
lots: Kulartz, §97 GWB, in Kulartz, Kus and Portz, Kommentar zum GWB Vergaberecht (Werner, 2nd 
ed. 2006), margin number 69.  
161 Article 32 (1) subparagraph 2 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015 
162 Smith, “Divide or Explain”, supra note 123. 
163 Regulation 84 Public Contract Regulations 2015 contains a number of reporting duties towards the 
Cabinet Office. 
164 Smith, “Divide or Explain”, supra note 123. Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU 
Competition Rules, supra note 13, at 347, also argues that this is a “soft requirement not amenable to 
review”. 
165 See: P. P. Craig and M. Trybus, “Public contracts: England and Wales” in R. Nogouellou and U. 
Stelkens (eds.) Comparative Law on Public Contracts Treatise (Bruylant: Brussels, 2010), 339-366 and 
M. Trybus, “An Overview of the United Kingdom Public Procurement Review and Remedies System 
with an Emphasis on England and Wales” in F. Lichère and S. Treumer (eds.), Enforcement of EU 
Public Procurement Rules (Djøf Publishing: Copenhagen, 2011), 201-234 
166 Smith, “Divide or Explain”, supra note 123. 
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participation by creating smaller and more manageable contract opportunities. In 
other words, what is the purpose of dividing a contract into lots when the bidder puts 
them together again by bidding for several or all lots?167 However, this criticism does 
not take account of the fact that markets differ. Some bidders might still bid for only 
one lot and others only for a few rather than all lots. Moreover, it assumes that in all 
imaginable scenarios the large company capable to bid for several or all lots will 
always be the economically most advantageous tender, irrespective of lot numbers 
and sizes, specialisms and geographical dispersion. Furthermore, preventing bidders 
from competing for more than one lot effectively restricts access to public 
contracts,168 which is legally and economically problematic. Economic theory 
supports flexible rules in this respect, to both foster competition through increased 
SME participation and at the same time allow larger tenderers to exploit economies of 
scale - and to encourage bidders to submit more competitive offers for a given 
package than they would for independent lots or for all the lots.169 The European 
Code of Best Practices already advised not to limit the number of lots a bidder can bid 
for in a way that would impair the conditions for fair competition.170 Savas suggested, 
however, that the buyer should set a relatively low maximum number of lots that a 
single tenderer can be awarded at any one time.171  
 It is also necessary to differentiate not only between SMEs and larger 
companies but also at least between the three main categories of SMEs, namely 
micro-, small-, and medium sized enterprises,172 the latter being relatively strong 
economically and therefore interested in significantly different contract value ranges. 
A supply contract with an overall value of €6 million, for example, would mainly be 
of interest to larger companies. Splitting it into three equal lots of €2 million makes it 
also interesting for medium-sized enterprises but not for small- and micro-sized ones. 
Splitting the contract into 30 lots of €200,000 each brings the contract into the reach 
of small- and even micro-sized enterprises but now the larger and even the medium-
sized enterprises might lose interest if only allowed to bid for one contract in a now 
possibly highly competitive environment with many bidders. The permission to bid 
for several or even all lots keeps the divided contract interesting for all types of 
bidders.   
   
6.1 Lot bundling and art.46 Directive 2014/24/EU 
According to art.46(2) Directive 2014/24/EU, the transposing national laws may 
provide that bids “may be submitted for one, for several or for all of the lots” of a 
divided contract. However, “even where tenders may be submitted for several or all 
lots, [the contracting authority may] limit the number of lots that may be awarded to 
one tenderer”. Furthermore, according to art.46(3) the transposing legislation may 
provide that “more than one lot may be awarded to the same tenderer,” and that 
“contracting authorities may award contracts combining several or all lots.” The 
transparency requirements that come with these paragraphs essentially provide that 
167 See also Lichère, “L’accès PME dans la Directive 2014/24”, supra note 8, at 112. 
168 Ibid., at 111. 
169 N. Dimitri, R. Pacini, M. Pagnozzi, and G. Spagnolo, “Multi-Contract Tendering Procedures and 
Package Bidding in Procurement” in Dimitri, Piga, and Spagnolo, supra note 9, 193, at 194-215; 
Sanchéz Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, supra note 13, at 350 also citing 
M. M. Lindhorst, J. Telgen, and F. Schotanus, supra note 53.  
170 SEC(2008) 2193, at 6-7. 
171 E. S. Savas, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships (Chatham House: New York, 2000), at 
186. 
172 Article 2 of Title I of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC. 
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the contract notice must state how many bids for how many lots are allowed. Thus 
art.46(2)-(3) allows the use of several approaches.  
First, bids may only be allowed for one lot, which begs the question of the 
consequences of submitting bids for more than one lot in such a case. This question 
had to be addressed in the transposing national laws (which it is not),173 guidance, or, 
failing that, case law.  
Second, bids may be allowed for several but not all lots, which begs the 
question of the consequences of submitting bids for all lots in such a case. Again, 
national laws,174 guidance, or case law would have to answer this question, although it 
would have been preferable for this question to be addressed in the Directive. In 
Germany, before the transposition of Directive 2014/24/EU, the number of lots that 
could be awarded to a single economic operator was limited, to promote SMEs. This 
limitation was a procurement condition based not on law but procurement practice 
which was however endorsed by jurisprudence.175 The new §30 VgV 2016176 now 
suggests various possibilities of allowing bids for several lots but §30(1) sentence 1 
VgV contains the option to set an upper limit of the number of lots that can be 
awarded to a single operator. This would allow the pre-2016 procurement practice of 
limiting bids for several lots to continue, thus showing an impact of harmonisation on 
the German legislation but not necessarily on procurement practice.177 Directive 
2014/24/EU sets a low floor of harmonisation allowing but not requiring lot limitation 
and, as the French example shows,178 did not change the national law in the 
transposition process and consequently has no effect on procurement practice. The 
Austrian law does not address the issue,179 and the UK and Irish Regulations just cut 
and paste the text of the Directive,180 thereby leaving these decisions to the 
contracting authorities.            
Third, bids for all lots may also be allowed. Again, when bids for several or all 
lots are allowed, that does not necessarily mean that the contracting authority must be 
obliged to award several or all lots to one bidder in case he or she submitted the 
economically most advantageous bid for all relevant lots. As Smith put it “the winner 
173 This question is neither addressed in Article 32 [French] Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 
2015; nor §97(4) sentence 3 [German] GWB 2016 and German §30 VgV 2016; nor Regulation 46 
[UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2015; nor Regulation 46 [Irish] European Union (Award of Public 
Authority Contracts) Regulations 2016, nor §22 [Austrian] BVergG 2006 as amended. 
174 This question is not addressed in Article 32 [French] Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015; 
§97(4) sentence 3 [German] GWB 2016; Regulation 46 [UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2015; 
Regulation 46 [Irish] European Union (Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 2016; or §22 
[Austrian] BVergG 2006 as amended.  
175 “Euro-Münzplätchen II”, OLG Düsseldorf, NZBau 2000, 440 as cited by Burgi, 
“Mittelstandsfreundliche Vergabe“, supra note 48, at 697.  
176 §30 VgV 2016: “1) Unbeschadet des § 97 Absatz 4 des Gesetzes gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen kann der öffentliche Auftraggeber festlegen, ob die Angebote nur für ein 
Los, für mehrere oder für alle Lose eingereicht werden dürfen. Er kann, auch wenn Angebote für 
mehrere oder alle Lose eingereicht werden dürfen, die Zahl der Lose auf eine Höchstzahl beschränken, 
für die ein einzelner Bieter den Zuschlag erhalten kann.” English: “Irrespective of §97(4) of the 
Competition Act, contracting authorities may provide, whether bids can be made for one lot, several 
lots, or all lots. The contracting authority may limit the number of lots that can be awarded to a single 
bidder, even when bids for several or all lots are allowed, [translation of the author].”   
177 Thanks to Martin Burgi for discussing this issue with the author. 
178 See art.32 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015 compared to art.10 CMP 2006. 
179 See: §22 BVergG 2006 as amended. 
180 See: Regulation 46 [UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2015; Regulation 46 [Irish] European Union 
(Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 2016 
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does not take all”.181 There is a difference between allowing multiple bids and 
allowing multiple awards, both being possible under the Directive,182 although its 
Recital 79 is more cautious regarding multiple awards. Moreover, Article 46(2) 
paragraph 2 Directive 2014/24/EU provides: 
 
“Contracting authorities may, even where tenders may be submitted for several or all 
lots, limit the number of lots that may be awarded to one tenderer, provided that the 
maximum number of lots per tenderer is stated in the contract notice or in the 
invitation to confirm interest. Contracting authorities shall indicate in the procurement 
documents the objective and non-discriminatory criteria or rules they intend to apply 
for determining which lots will be awarded where the application of the award criteria 
would result in one tenderer being awarded more lots than the maximum number.” 
 
This paragraph suggests that if certain requirements are met, the contracting authority 
could still award a number of lots that exceeds the upper limit set to the same 
economic operator. However, in the Member States who have transposed this 
possibility the decision would have to be taken by the contracting authority. This 
paragraph was transposed in the German §30(2) sentence 2 VgV 2016, Regulation 
46(4) and (5) of the [UK] Public Contract Regulations 2015, and Regulation 46(4) 
and (5) of the [Irish] European Union (Award of Public Authority Contracts) 
Regulations 2016, but not in Austria and France. The German §30 VgV 2016 and 
Article 32(1) subparagraph 3 of the 2015 French Ordonnance expressly allows 
limitation of both bids and awards. In deciding which of these possibilities to use, the 
contracting authority needs to know the relevant market well and depending on the 
situation and the possibility used, there are the dangers of conservative bidding, 
unsustainable bidding, and of collusion.183  
The procurement laws of Member States that already exressly provided for the 
division into lots before 2014, notably France,184 Germany,185 and Austria186 also 
allowed bids for multiple lots and did not change this approach when transposing the 
Directive.187 Regulation 46(3)-(6) of the 2015 UK- and Regulation 46(3)-(6) of the 
2016 Irish Regulations transposed art.46(2)-(3) Directive 2014/24/EU word for word. 
181 Smith, “Divide or Explain”, supra note 123. 
182 Lichère, “L’accès PME dans la Directive 2014/24”, supra note 8, at 112. 
183 Smith, “Divide or Explain”, supra note 123. 
184 Article 10 CMP 2006: “Si plusieurs lots sont attribués à un même titulaire […]” English: “If 
multiple lots are awarded to one and the same bidder [translation of the author].“ 
185 Old § 97(3) GWB: „Mehrere Teil- oder Fachlose dürfen zusammen vergeben werden, wenn 
wirtschaftliche oder technische Gründe dies erfordern.“ English: „Multiple [...] lots may be awarded 
together [to one bidder] when this is required for economic or technical reasons [translation of the 
author].”  
186 §22 BVergG 2006 as amended does not expressly address this issue. §22(2) sentence 3 BVergG 
2006 provides: “In diesem Fall ist dem Bieter auch die Möglichkeit einzuräumen, nur einzelne dieser 
Teile der Leistung anzubieten.” English: “In this case [when the contract has been divided] the bidder 
has to be given the opportunity to make an offer only for parts of this contract [translation of the 
author].” As the text speaks of the plural “Teile”, English “parts”, this suggests that offers can be made 
for more than one lot. There is no provision that would limit the number of lots that can be awarded to 
one bidder. However, this provision dates from the 2006 version of the Austrian act and is not part of 
the transposition of Directive 2016/24/EU – in contrast to §22(4) sentence 3 BVergG 2006 as amended.    
187 For France Article 32 I. para 3 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015 reads: “Les acheteurs 
peuvent limiter le nombre de lots pour lesquels un opérateur économique peut présenter une offre ou le 
nombre de lots qui peuvent être attribués à un même opérateur économique.” English: “The contracting 
authority may limit the number of lots for which an economic operator may submit a tender or the 
number of lots that can be awarded to one and the same economic operator [translation of the author].”  
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The Directive allows leaving all decisions regarding lot bundling and 
limitation to the contracting authorities. Again, this is considered a wise approach 
since only the earlier are close enough to the market to make these decisions. It would 
thus be difficult to subject them to abstract rules in national procurement laws, 
although the Directive allows that as well. France, Germany, Ireland, Austria, and the 
UK left bundling and limitation decisions to the contracting authorities.188 According 
to Sánchez Graells, art.46 largely reflects economic theory regarding lot bundling, by 
allowing: (1) multiple bidding and (2) restrictions on the number of lots to be 
awarded to the same bidder. 189 The limitation of the number of lots an economic 
operator can bid for, possible but not required under the Directive, however, is more 
problematic as competition is compromised because larger bidders are prevented to 
use their advantages.    
 
6.2 Alterative bids and art.46 Directive 2014/24/EU 
A related question is whether art.46 Directive 2014/24/EU allows a bidder to make 
different bids for each individual lot on the one hand, and a different and lower bid if 
he or she is awarded several or all lots on the other hand (alternative bids). In other 
words, whether art.46(2) allows a bidder to offer a rebate if awarded several or all 
lots.190 Article 10 of the old French CMP 2006 expressly prohibited such a rebate as 
favouring larger companies.191 For the same reason it could be argued that alternative 
bids would go against the objectives of art.46 Directive 2014/24/EU. If rebates can be 
offered for all the lots then the SMEs for which the contract has been divided will be 
priced out of the competition, thereby undermining the SME-friendly objectives of the 
costly division into lots.192 On the other hand, it could be argued that offering rebates 
is desirable as enhancing competition and value for money, unless it infringed EU 
competition law, mainly on predatory pricing but also on exclusionary rebates.193 
Moreover, it could be argued that if the exploitation of economies of scale by larger 
For Germany: § 97(4) sentence 3 GWB 2016 reads: “Several partial or trade-specific lots may be 
awarded collectively if this is required for economic or technical reasons.” More specifically then 
§30(1) VgV reads: “[…] kann der öffentliche Auftraggeber festlegen, ob die Angebote nur für ein Los, 
für mehrere oder für alle Lose eingereicht werden dürfen. Er kann, auch wenn Angebote für mehrere 
oder alle Lose eingereicht werden dürfen, die Zahl der Lose auf eine Höchstzahl beschränken, für die 
ein einzelner Bieter den Zuschlag erhalten kann.” English: “[…] the contracting authority can 
determine if economic operators may bid only for one lot or several or for all lots. It can, even when 
bids for several or all lots are allowed, limit the maximum number of lots that can be awarded to any 
one bidder [translation of the author].”  
188 See art.32 I para 3 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015; §97(4) sentence 3 GWB 2016 and 
§30(1) VgV 2016; §22 [Austrian] BVergG 2006; reg.46 [UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2015; 
reg.46 [Irish] European Union (Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 2016. 
189 Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, supra note 13, at 351. 
190 Thanks to François Lichère for bringing this issue to my attention when commenting on an earlier 
draft of this article. 
191 Article 10 (1) sentence 3 Code des Marchés Publics 2006: “Les candidats ne peuvent présenter des 
offres variables selon le nombre de lots susceptibles d'être obtenus.” English: “Bidders shall not submit 
alternative offers for the lots they are bidding for [translation of the author].” This issue is not 
addressed in §97(3) of the old German GWB.  
192 Whether the division into lots in art.46 is an SME-friendly measure that does not compromise the 
other objectives of the Directive such as competition or other procurement objectives such as value for 
money - or indeed a SME-favouring measure that does compromise these objectives, is not discussed 
in this article but in Trybus and Andrecka, supra note 7, at 230-231, where it is argued that this is 
merely a SME-friendly measure that does not significantly compromise competition and value for 
money.    
193 Thanks to Albert Sanchez Graells for discussing this competition law point with me.  
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companies is to be limited to avoid disadvantages for SMEs, then this should not be 
done by prohibiting rebates but earlier by limiting the number of lots an individual 
economic operator can bid for. In other words, the question of what is more 
important, economics of scale or SME participation, is to be answered as part of the 
bundling decision not by allowing or prohibiting rebates. If bundling is allowed then 
rebates should be allowed as well, if bundling is not allowed then the question of 
rebates does not arise. However, art.46 does not address rebates at all. 
A further question relates to the relationship of alternative bids with other 
relevant rules in Directive 2014/24/EU, most importantly, the rules on variants. As 
Arrowsmith explains, a variant proposes a solution to the contracting authority’s 
requirements that differs from that set out in the specifications.194 If alternative bids 
were covered by this notion, they would have to meet the requirements for variants: to 
be authorised or required in the contract notice or invitation to confirm interest and to 
be connected to the subject matter of the contract, art.45(1). Moreover, there are 
relevant requirements regarding the tender documentation.195 However, it is submitted 
that alternative bids are not covered by the notion of variants as they do not offer 
alternatives to the technical specifications. This does not mean that the Directive 
precludes alternative bids, but merely that the rules on variants in art.45 do not apply 
to them.196 There is nothing in the wording of the rules on award criteria in art.67, on 
life-cycle costing in art.68, or on abnormally low tenders in art.69 Directive 
2014/24/EU that could be interpreted as excluding alterative bids either. 
While alternative bids are not addressed in the Directive,197 it is submitted that 
the general principles stemming from the TFEU allow them if certain conditions are 
met. The principle of competition requires alternative bids since they can lead to 
lower prices. The principles of equal treatment, transparency, and competition require 
the possibility to make alternative bids to be communicated to bidders – in the 
national procurement law or in the contract notice or the tender documents. A lack of 
transparency might compromise competition when bidders refrain from making 
alternative bids simply by not being aware of the possibility or assuming it to be 
prohibited. Equal treatment might be compromised, when due to the lack of 
transparency and clarity some bidders are disadvantaged by not making alternative 
bids while others are offering rebates. In other words, equal treatment would be 
compromised since tenderers were disadvantaged because they were complying with 
what they legitimately perceived to be the rules of a tender involving the division into 
lots.198 This would mean that contracting authorities would have to reject alternative 
194 Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 798 provides two examples: “by providing for a contract length that 
is greater than that referred to in the standard specification, or by proposing a different technical 
solution for a construction project”. See also C. Bovis, EC Public Procurement: Case Law and 
Regulation (OUP: Oxford, 2006), at 436-437 and Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU 
Competition Rules, supra note 13, at 391-400 citing at 396 the relevant case law inter alia C-421/01, 
Traunfelder [2003] ECR I-11941 and C-423/07, Commission v Spain [2010] ECR I-3429. 
195 See also the requirements in art.46(2) and (3) Directive 2014/24/EU. 
196 Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 801. 
197 Nor is the European Code of Best Practices, supra note 9, at 7-8 (Recital 78 Directive 2014/24/EU 
still recommends the use of this document).  
198 This point about equal treatment and transparency was highlighted in the similar case of exclusion 
on the basis violation of administrative (anti-mafia) obligations which were difficult to find because 
that would disadvantage non-domestic tenderers in Case C-27/15, Pippo Pizzo v. CRGT Srl 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:404 and especially the Advisory Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bardona 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:48. See also Advisory Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bardona in Case C-171/15,   
Connexxion Taxi Services BV v. Staat der Nederlanden (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en 
27 
 
                                                 
bids unless they have been authorised by the national procurement law or the 
contracting authority.     
§22(2) of the Austrian BVergG 2006 as amended requires to advertise both the 
entire contract and its lots in parallel if a contracting authority wants to reserve the 
option to award the contract in its entirety. This suggests that in this case parallel bids 
from the same operator would also be allowed, possibly including alternative bids, 
although this is not expressly addressed. France, as Lichère points out 
“surprisingly”,199 allowed the previously banned alternative bids in its 2015 
Ordonnance transposing Directive 2014/24/EU.200 The decision about their use was 
left to the contracting authorities who “authorised”, which also implies communicated 
about the possibility to make, alternative bids. However, in a 2016 amendment of the 
2015 Ordonnance, France reverted to the ban on alternative bids.201  Neither §97(4) 
GWB 2016 nor §30 VgV clarify whether alternative bids are allowed in Germany and 
neither reg.46 [UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2015 nor reg.46 of the Irish 2016 
Regulations do address the question. Thus, in accordance with the point on 
transparency and equal treatment made in the previous paragraph, in Germany, the 
UK, and the Republic of Ireland this would have to be decided and communicated by 
the contracting authorities, in the contract notice and tender documentation. Lichère 
points out, that allowing alternative bids with rebates is good for the public purse but 
less so for SMEs.202 He argued that if the French legislator really wanted to favour 
SMEs they better revert to the prohibition of alternative bids, which the legislator did 
in late 2016,203 although this would take economies of scale out of public contracts.204 
It is submitted that the low level of harmonisation leaves the possibility of rebates to 
be decided by the transposing Member States, the short-lived change of the French 
law was not required by Directive 2014/24/EU. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the 
new Directive with its SME friendly objectives appears to have led to this initial 
repeal of an SME promoting measure. However, this also shows the low level of 
harmonisation. As a consequence, provided they meet the requirements discussed 
above, the Directive allows alternative bids, since it does not expressly prohibit them. 
A systematic interpretation with art.45 supports this finding: although variants widen 
the field and are thus increasing competition, the Directive prohibits them unless the 
Sport) and Others ECLI:EU:C:2016:506, at paragraph 59 and the judgment of the Court 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:948, at paragraphs 39 and 40.  
199 Lichère, “L’accès PME dans la Directive 2014/24”, supra note 8, at 112.  
200 Article 32(1) subparagraph 4 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015: “Les offres sont 
appréciées lot par lot sauf lorsque l'acheteur a autorisé les opérateurs économiques à présenter des 
offres variables selon le nombre de lots susceptibles d'être obtenus.: “Les offres sont appréciées lot par 
lot sauf lorsque l'acheteur a autorisé les opérateurs économiques à présenter des offres variables selon 
le nombre de lots susceptibles d'être obtenus [emphasis added].” English: “The bids are considered lot-
by-lot, except when the contracting authority has authorised the economic operators to make alternative 
bids for the number of the lots they are bidding for [translation of the author].”      
201 Article 32(1) subparagraph 4 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015 as amended by the loi n° 
2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016: “Les offres sont appréciées lot par lot. Les candidats ne peuvent 
présenter des offres variables selon le nombre de lots susceptibles d'être obtenus.” English: “The bids 
are considered lot-by-lot. The bidders may not make alternative bids for the number of lots they can be 
awarded [translation of the author].”   
202 Lichère, “L’accès PME dans la Directive 2014/24”, supra note 8, at 112. 
203 Compare the versions of Article 32(1) subparagraph 4 of 2015 in supra note 200 and of late 2016 in 
supra note 201. 
204 Lichère, “L’accès PME dans la Directive 2014/24”, supra note 8, at 112. 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                            
contracting authority authorises them and informs everyone about it in the tender 
documentation.205  
  
7. Likely impact   
It is submitted that the impact of the division into lots regime of art.46 Directive 
2014/24/EU will be limited and that a significant increase in SME participation 
cannot be expected in many Member States. This is due to several factors 
compromising the approach of the Directive. 
 First, as discussed in the previous sections of this article, while making the 
division into lots the default approach, art.46 Directive 2014/24/EU does not 
sufficiently develop the old regime based on art.9 Directive 2004/18/EC and the 2008 
European Code of Best Practices. Apart from the “and explain” element of “divide or 
explain”, which as discussed above might be undermined by ‘cut and paste’ 
explanations which might be difficult to challenge in review bodies in practice, art.46 
is so flexible it could be described as only formally hard law. The regime is an 
example of minimum harmonisation in which voluntary division and the ‘divide or 
explain’ principle constitute the firm floor. However, this floor is too low as Member 
States’ transposition and contracting authorities’ implementation can make the ‘or 
explain’ aspect - and thus refraining from a division into lots - very easy. Above the 
firm floor, Member States can tightly regulate the ‘or explain’ or even make division 
compulsory. However, neither the compulsory division into lots, nor bid bundling, nor 
award bundling, nor the question of alternative bids are harmonised. The effect of this 
level of minimum harmonisation is that Member States could largely continue their 
regimes and practices before Directive 2014/24/EU when transposing the instrument. 
Germany and France continue with a compulsory division into lots and the UK, 
Ireland, and Austria with an optional approach, adding only the ‘or explain’ aspect, 
which, again, can be satisfied relatively easily. The result with regards to national 
transposition is that little has changed. Since the national legal frameworks have not 
changed significantly, procurement practice is unlikely to change either. Without a 
change of the legal framework and procurement practice there is no reason to expect a 
change in the level of the allegedly desired SME participation in public contracts, at 
least not because of the division into lots regime of Directive 2014/24/EU. Only the 
higher profile of the division into lots through its formally ‘hard law’ nature might 
help to slightly increase SME participation in some Member States. 
 Second, there is data on the French experience which indicates that not even 
the introduction of a compulsory division into lots in 2006 led to an increase in 
contracts awarded to SME.206 While this data does not comprehensively prove the 
205 Thanks to Albert Sánchez Graells for discussing this point with me. 
206 According to data regularly collected by the Observatoire Economique de L’Achat Public, a body 
under the French Ministry of Finance, Economy, and Industry (on file), the share of SMEs in public 
contracts (total, State, regional and local authorities) were:  in 2004: 64% by number and 36% by 
value, in 2005: 64% by number and 32% by value, in 2006: 64% by number and 27% by value,  in 
2007: 62% by number and 35% by value, in 2008: 60% by number and 30% by value, in 2009: 62% by 
number and 28% by value, in 2010: 60% by number and 27% by value, in 2011: 57% by number and 
25% by value, in 2012: 57% by number and 28% by value, and in 2013: 58% by number and 27% by 
value. While the share of regional and local authorities’ contracts in both number and value stayed 
broadly the same in this 2004 to 2013 period, the share of the number of contracts awarded by the 
central State level contracting authorities actually (slightly) decreased: 55% in 2004, 59% in 2005, 52% 
in 2006 and 2007, 49% in 2008, 43% in 2009, 46% in 2010, 50.3% in 2011, 50.6% in 2012, and 51.1% 
in 2013. While the interpretation of these figures is difficult and problematic as they are subject to a 
multitude of influences other than legislative change (for example the economic crises or political 
changes) they do not show any impact of the introduction of compulsory division into lots in 2006. 
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absence of such an effect, especially not for all Member States, at least this a maiore 
ad minus suggests that the softer UK ‘divide or explain’ regime is even less likely to 
produce an increase in SME participation. 
 Third, the SME friendly division into lots regime cannot be seen in isolation. 
Directive 2014/24/EU reinforced the aggregation regimes, framework agreements in 
art.33,207 dynamic purchasing systems in art.34,208 and centralised purchasing in 
art.37.209 Moreover, a new aggregation regime on ad hoc joint procurement was 
introduced in art.38.210 These regimes have the objectives to reduce costs and increase 
buyer power. While this cannot be quantified due to a lack of reliable data, the 
division into lots will require additional resources, most importantly staff time, 
thereby increasing costs. Moreover, it is designed to further the interests of SMEs as 
sellers as contracts are divided into lots with the intention to adapt them to SME 
capacities. Herrera argued that this constitutes a contradiction of objectives as demand 
aggregation undermines the division into lots.211 Not only in times of economic crises 
and tightening budgets, the need to reduce costs and more generally the interests of 
contracting authorities might prevail over those of the SMEs. The division into lots 
regime might prove to be too soft to counteract the effects of the reinforced and 
extended aggregation regime with a smaller share of the procurement pie for SME as 
a result. However, even centralised public procurement agencies, such as the Austrian 
Bundesbeschaffungs GmbH or the French UGAP, are subject to the division into lots 
regime212 thus softening the contradiction highlighted by Herrera. Moreover, the more 
207 In framework agreements one or several economic operators are selected for an agreement 
concerning a particular type of supply, service, or work to be procured during a limited period in the 
future and on the basis of terms laid down by the contracting entity. During the life time of the 
framework agreement all relevant individual contracts, also called ‘call-offs’, are awarded to either the 
only private party or to one of the selected operators party to the agreement on the basis of the same if 
often more precisely formulated terms. Framework agreements limit competition as only parties to the 
agreement may be awarded contracts, especially when they are concluded with only one private 
operator (See Trepte, supra note 104, at 212). Framework agreements will not only be used for the 
purchase of office equipment or spare parts, but also for routine repair and maintenance services for 
equipment or buildings (Trepte, ibid., at 208). On the rules under Directive 2014/24/EU see F. Lichère 
and S. Richetto, “Framework agreements, dynamic purchasing systems and public e-procurement” in 
Lichère, Caranta, and Treumer, Modernising Public Procurement, supra note 3, 185-224. 
208 Dynamic purchasing systems are a hybrid electronic procedure for commonly used purchases. They 
have to be based on the open procedure; they are “a new mechanism for the electronic application of 
the open procedure” as Trepte, ibid., at 410 put it. On dynamic purchasing systems in the old Public 
Sector Directive:  Trepte, ibid., at 409-415; Bovis, supra note 12, at 253-256 and 320-323; and in great 
detail: S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (Sweet&Maxwell: London, 2nd ed. 
2005) at 1207-1221. On the rules under Directive 2014/24/EU see Lichère and Richetto, ibid. 
209 Centralised purchasing does not necessarily lead to a reduction of chances of SMEs. For example, in 
Austria procurement is extensively centralised in the Bundesbeschaffungs GmbH (BBG, English: 
‘Federal Procurement Ltd.’). The BBG awards 65-67 per cent of its contracts to SMEs – through the 
division of contracts into regional lots, distribution structures through local partners, and the formation 
of tender consortia: http://www.bbg.gv.at/english/facts-figures/ [accessed 2 October 2017].  
210 See G. M. Racca, “Joint Procurement Challenges in the Future Implementation of the New 
Directives in Lichère, Caranta, and Treumer, Modernising Public Procurement, supra note 3, 225-254. 
211 Herrera, supra note 8, at 141-143. See also Report of the UK Federation of Small Businesses: 
Public Procurement: A consultation on changes to public procurement rules in Scotland (FSB, April 
2015), Question 11: “This move to collaborative, centralised purchasing has been, by far, the single 
biggest change to small businesses bidding for public contracts in Scotland in recent years and is the 
main source of frustration.” 
212 The Bundesbeschaffungs GmbH is under the obligation to especially consider the role of SMEs as 
bidders in contracts regarding predefined supplies and services (for example cleaning services for 
buildings, office and computer equipment, food, etc.), in line with their general policy and practice to 
use procurement techniques and approaches as far as they are considered effective for the procurement 
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professionalised workforce in these agencies is perhaps in a better position to optimise 
the division into lots without the help of outside consultants.   
 Fourth and finally, as discussed under 2.1 above,213 the participation of SMEs 
in public procurement procedures and even their success rate could be interpreted as 
already relatively high, with limited room for improvement through any reform, 
including the division into lots. 
 
8. Conclusions 
The division into lots regime of art.46 Directive 2014/24/EU is not improving the 
prospects for SMEs in public procurement across the EU. The firm floor of minimum 
harmonisation is set too low and consequently did not lead to any significant 
legislative changes at the national level during the transposition process. 
Consequently, there is no reason to expect a change of practice based on this largely 
unchanged legal framework. Thus, no significant shift towards the promotion of 
SMEs has occurred through the division into lots regime of Directive 2014/24/EU.       
 This article isolated the regime on the division into lots as the most extensive 
measure to facilitate SME participation in Directive 2014/24/EU. The assessment of 
the regime provided contributes to the discussion but is not sufficient to answer the 
question whether the Directive can meet its objectives to increase SME participation 
in public procurement. That would have to include at least the other three measures: 
the minimum turnover requirement,214 the European Single Procurement 
Document,215 and direct payments to subcontractors,216 which would go beyond the 
aims of this article. However, although these measures all address problems raised by 
stakeholders during the consultation, scepticism is in order, since these regimes have 
their own issues and are even more limited than the division into lots regime.217 
Moreover, all four measures, with exception of art.71(2) Directive 2014/24/EU, is 
directed at SME as prime contractors. SMEs want to be prime contractors and 
subcontracting is considered only the second-best option since SMEs in supply chains 
often feel squeezed by the larger companies who act as prime contractors. Prime 
contractors are not subject to Directive 2014/24/EU when awarding subcontracts, 
unless the contracting authority imposes a contract condition to that effect. Title III of 
Directive 2009/81/EC on defence procurement shows that more could be done when 
in question based on the detailled market analysis preceeding any procurement procedures. This 
includes the division of larger contracts into lots. In this respect the Bundesbeschaffungs GmbH has to 
advertise lots for which this is adequate with regard to the type and size of the contracts on a regional  
basis, so that if possible even micro-businesses can participate in the procurement procedure 
(qualification criteria), in particular considering the structure of local sourcing (örtliche 
Nahversorgungsstruktur). Moreover, for particular supplies or services, such as for medical equipment, 
contracts are divided into technical lots. Overall, it can be said roughly that for example food contracts 
are almost always divided into (regional) lots while for example for medical equipment they are 
sometimes divided into (technical) lots.  
213 See the figures in Wessel Thomassen et altera, supra note 2. 
214 Article 58(3) Directive 2014/24/EU. Essentially, to qualify bidders need to have a minimum 
turnover of (only) twice the contract value. See Trybus and Andrecka, supra note 7, at 234-236; and 
Trybus, supra note 8, at 272-274. 
215 Article 59 Directive 2014/24/EU. Essentially, a single electronic proof of qualification and selection 
criteria replacing a multitude of documents intended to cut red tape. See Trybus and Andrecka, ibid., at 
231-234; Trybus, ibid., at 266-271; and Telles, supra note 8.   
216 Article 71(3) Directive 2014/24/EU. Essentially, contracting paying the subcontractors directly 
rather than the prime. See Trybus and Andrecka, supra note 7, at 236-237; and Trybus, supra note 8, at 
274-278. 
217 See Trybus and Andrecka, ibid. and Trybus, ibid. on all four measures and Telles, supra note 8, on 
the ESPD.   
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the supply chain, where SME play a bigger role, is addressed extensively in the 
legislation.218 However, such a regime for the entire public sector would be 
burdensome and of doubtful benefit for many contracts.219 
To significantly promote SMEs as prime contractors, the new Directive would 
also have to have provided a regime for public contracts below the thresholds. Such a 
regime regulated in the Directive rather than being based on the principles of the 
TFEU or, alternatively, lower thresholds could be more effective measures to improve 
the opportunities of SMEs as prime contractors rather than subcontractors. However, 
especially the introduction of a regulated regime for contracts below the thresholds is 
a controversial issue.220  
218 The fact that there are few regulatory constraints on prime contractors may further impact SMEs in 
the supply chain, although this has never been fully explored. Luke Butler addressed this issue with 
regards to defence procurement in his paper at the conference “International Public Procurement: 
comparing the EU and the US. The case of military procurement” at the Turin Congress Centre 
organised by the European Law Institute at the University of Turin on 22 September 2017. 
219 A possible exception here could be works concession since they are long term contracts. Thanks to 
François Lichère for pointing this out to me during the European Public Procurement Law Group 
meeting in Aix-en-Provence in July 2013.   
220 Some stakeholders criticised the lack of clarity of the rules for procurement below the thresholds, 
see Green Paper-Consultation-Synthesis of Replies, supra note 4, at 12. However, they were “evenly 
divided on the issue”.  
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